Warianty tytułu
Price War in Oligopoly
Języki publikacji
Abstrakty
Przedmiotem opracowania jest modelowanie zjawiska wojny cenowej w oligopolu.
In the article the author presents nonelementary collision games reflecting the behaviour of oligopolic companies in the course of price wars. The solutions of the Bertrand paradox and the auctioneer predicament in the Cournot model are demonstrated. Using this method industries of decreasing advantages in the scale are analyzed. In addition the author describes the behaviour of industries of increasing advantages in the scale such as competition and destructive war leading to a natural monopoly.(original abstract)
Rocznik
Numer
Strony
109--121
Opis fizyczny
Twórcy
autor
Bibliografia
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- Cohen K., Cyert R., Theory of the Firm: Receoursce Allocation in a Market Economy, New York 1965.
- Cygan A., Dach Z., Kosiec K., Mikroekonomia - zachowania rynkowe, Kraków 1994.
- Cygan A., Kosiec K., Meandry biznesu - rynki, Kraków 1993.
- Kreps D., A Course in Microeconomic Theory, New York 1990.
- Kreps D., Scheinkman J., Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand Competition Yield Cournot Outcomes, "Bell Journal of Economics" 1983. 14.
- Maskin E., Tirole J., A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, I: Overview and Quality Competition with Large Fixed Costs, "Econometrica" 1988, 56.
- Posner R., The Appropriate Scope of Regulation in the Cable Television Industry, "Bell Journal of Economics" 1972, 3.
- Tirole J., The Theory of Industrial Organization, New York 1990.
Typ dokumentu
Bibliografia
Identyfikatory
Identyfikator YADDA
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