Stopień rozproszenia renty a rozmiary społecznych kosztów monopolu

• Autorzy: Mirosław Raczyński

Warianty tytułu

Rent Dissipation and Social Cost of Monopoly

• Języki publikacji: PL

Abstrakty

Omówiono możliwość uzyskania renty i jej wpływ na społeczne koszty monopolu. Scharakteryzowano teorię pogoni za rentą.

EN

In the article the author demonstrates various presentation of the problem of the limits of rent dissipation process. In the rent-seeking theory no consensus has been reached on the extent of that phenomenon. Theoretically several possibilities are considered here. The rent may be wholly dissipated which means that resources invested in rent-seeking are equal to the rents to be earned. In other cases rent may only be partially dissipated. Finally, there are situations, which are least advantageous from the society's point of view, in which the size of resources used in the rent-seeking process exceeds the rent "to be won". Under some specific conditions it may also happen that the rent-seeking may produce net benefit for the society. The information concerning the actual extent of rent dissipation is important while attempting to assess the social cost incurred by monopolies. (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

PL

Teoria pogoni za rentą; Monopol

EN

Rent-seeking theory; Monopoly

• Czasopismo: Zeszyty Naukowe / Akademia Ekonomiczna w Krakowie
• Rocznik: 1996
• Numer: nr 476
• Strony: 123--133

Twórcy

autor

Mirosław Raczyński

Bibliografia

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