Racjonalność zachowań elektoratu w świetle ekonomicznych modeli polityki

• Autorzy: Zbigniew Jan Stańczyk

Warianty tytułu

Rationality of Electorate's Behaviour in the Light of Economic Models of Politics

• Języki publikacji: PL

Abstrakty

Przedmiotem artykułu jest ekonomiczna teoria demokracji A. Downsa w kontekście wyborów prezydenckich w Polsce w 1995 roku.

EN

The paper deals with the history and the main assumptions underlying economic models of electorate behaviour. The paper also deals briefly with some important statements derived from the models in question and the controversies they have provoked. In the final part of the paper the author presents hypotheses related to the advantages as well as the theoretical problems which may arise in the course of the application of the said models for a description of the behaviour of the Polish electorate. (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

PL

Demokracja; Modele ekonomiczne; Wybory prezydenckie; Socjologia polityki

EN

Democracy; Economic models; Presidential election; Sociology of politics

• Czasopismo: Zeszyty Naukowe / Akademia Ekonomiczna w Krakowie
• Rocznik: 1997
• Numer: nr 490
• Strony: 99--111

Twórcy

autor

Zbigniew Jan Stańczyk

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