Warianty tytułu
Agency Theory and Dividend Policy
Języki publikacji
Abstrakty
Polityka dywidend w kontekście teorii agencji powoduje sprzeczność interesów między kadrą menedżerską a akcjonariuszami. Zagadnieniu temu poświęcony jest artykuł.
The article deals with agency theory in the context of dividend policy. It shows that conflicts of interests between managers and stockholders and between stockholders and bondholders can be partly reduced by legal regulations. They can be used to control conflicts between these groups of people. (original abstract)
Rocznik
Tom
Numer
Strony
106--112
Opis fizyczny
Twórcy
autor
Bibliografia
- Jensen M.С.: Agency Cost of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and Takeovers. "American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings" 1986, 76.
- Jensen M.C., Meckling W.H.: Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure. "Journal of Financial Economics" 1976, 4.
- Jensen M.C., Smith C.W. Jr.: Stockholder, Manager, and Creditor Interests: Applications of Agency Theory. W: Recent Advances in Corporate Finance (ed.) E.I. Altman, M.G. Subrahmanyam. Homewood 1985.
- Kalay A.: Stockholder - Bondholder Conflict and Dividend Constraints. "Journal of Financial Economics" 1982, 10.
- La Porta R., Lopez-de-Silanes F., Shleifer A., Vishny R.W.: Agency Problems and Dividend Policies Around the World. "NBER Working Paper" nr 6594, June 1998.
Typ dokumentu
Bibliografia
Identyfikatory
Identyfikator YADDA
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