Aktualność propozycji wprowadzenia obowiązkowej emisji podporządkowanych instrumentów dłużnych przez banki

• Autorzy: Krzysztof Jackowicz

Warianty tytułu

Timeliness of Proposal to Introduction Obligatory Issue of Debentures by Banks

• Języki publikacji: PL

Abstrakty

Perspektywa wprowadzenia obowiązku emisji podporządkowanych instrumentów dłużnych wydaje się dość odległa. Celem artykułu jest próba odpowiedzi na pytanie, na ile tego rodzaju propozycje stanowią składnik historii myśli ekonomicznej, a w jakiej mierze są wciąż elementem zestawu możliwych do wprowadzenia reform systemu regulacyjnego. W pierwszej kolejności autor omawia czynniki predestynujące podporządkowane instrumenty dłużne do roli nośników dyscypliny rynkowej. Następnie przedstawia dyskusję toczącą się wokół zasadniczych elementów konstrukcyjnych programów obowiązkowej emisji instrumentów rozważanego typu. W końcowej części artykułu prezentuje możliwości harmonizacji oraz wady polityki obowiązkowej emisji obligacji podporządkowanych.

EN

The author discussed factors, which determined debentures to the role of market discipline carriers. Next presented discussion about main construction elements of programmes obligatory issue of debentures. Finally showed possibilities of harmonization and disadvantages of debentures obligatory issue.(M.P.)

Słowa kluczowe

PL

Banki; Emisja papierów wartościowych; Depozyt bankowy

EN

Banks; Securities emission; Bank deposit

• Czasopismo: Studia i Prace Kolegium Zarządzania i Finansów / Szkoła Główna Handlowa
• Rocznik: 2004
• Numer: z. 41
• Strony: 83--99

Twórcy

autor

Krzysztof Jackowicz

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