Wynagradzanie oparte na własności jako element ładu korporacyjnego - w poszukiwaniu optimum

• Autorzy: Krzysztof Zalega
• Języki publikacji: PL

Abstrakty

Przedmiotem zainteresowania jest zagadnienie wynagradzania opartego na własności (ecquity-based lub stock-based executive compensation) jako jednej z form wynagradzania kierownictwa korporacji. Zwrócono uwagę na wynagradzanie menedżerów akcjami i opcjami na akcje, w aspekcie efektywności tego mechanizmu nadzoru korporacyjnego.

Słowa kluczowe

PL

Ład korporacyjny; Płace menedżerów

EN

Corporate governance; Managerial wages

• Czasopismo: Przegląd Organizacji
• Rocznik: 2004
• Numer: nr 2
• Strony: 12--16

Twórcy

autor

Krzysztof Zalega

Bibliografia

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