Wpływ praktyk kartelowych oraz regulacja przepływu kapitału na bezpośrednie inwestycje zagraniczne w latach 1990-2002

• Autorzy: Andrzej Buszko

Warianty tytułu

The Impact of Cartel Practices and Capital Movements Regulation on Foreign Direct Investment in the Years 1990-2002

• Języki publikacji: PL

Abstrakty

Głównym celem pracy jest przedstawienie wpływu praktyk kartelowych wpływających na poziom bezpośrednich światowych inwestycji zagranicznych. Czynnikiem osłabiającym poziom i dynamikę tych inwestycji jest obecność międzynarodowych karteli. Porozumienia kartelowe ograniczają ich napływ. Trend ten jest szczególnie widoczny w przypadku znacznego udziału członków porozumienia kartelowego w rynku światowym. Natomiast ich niski udział w rynku w zasadniczy sposób nie rzutuje na poziom inwestycji zagranicznych.

EN

The aim of this article is to determine major factors of the level of foreign direct investment (FDI). A macroeconomic situation of countries has been presented along with legal regulations limiting the access to local markets. In the years 1990-2002, the number of agreements concluded between FDI exporters and importers was 2,031. Attention has been drawn to correlations between the number of concluded agreements and the level of investment. The analysis has covered the countries of South-East Asia, South America and Central and Eastern Europe. The study involves an analysis of the rank correlation measure, allowing to determine the relationship between the examined features. A close correlation between the number of concluded agreements (regulating capital movement) and FDI level has been determined for the countries of South-East Asia. The rank correlation measure amounting to 0.975 proves that the tested hypotheses are correct. A major role in this respect is played by bilateral agreements. They allow to reduce differences, to meet foreign investors' expectations and, by the same token, to increase capital inflow. A major problem is posed by activities of international cartels. Price increase and a fall in the level and growth rate of global direct investment are direct consequences of their presence. Concern is expressed over long duration of cartel agreements and over low penalties imposed on their participants. Cartel agreements are concluded in both economically developed and developing countries. The article presents shares of typical goods covered by cartel agreements in world trade. A cartel agreement slows down the growth rate of imports to OECD markets, accompanied by a rise in exports to developing countries. (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

PL

Inwestycje bezpośrednie; Inwestycje zagraniczne; Przepływy kapitałowe; Inwestycje; Dynamika inwestycji; Koniunktura gospodarcza

EN

Direct investments; Foreign investment; Capital flows; Investment; Dynamic of investment; Business trends

• Czasopismo: Gospodarka Narodowa
• Rocznik: 2004
• Numer: nr 1-2
• Strony: 71--86

Twórcy

autor

Andrzej Buszko

Bibliografia

• Anderson R.D., Jenny F., [2001], Current Developments in Competition Policy in The world trade organization, Antitrust, Fall, NY.
• Aykut D., Ratha D., [2003], South and South flows in 1990, Background paper for Global Development Finance 2002, Washington.
• Canada J., White J., [1990], Capital Investment Decision Analysis for Management and Engineering, Pretince Hall, Inc., New York.
• Connor J.M., [2001], Global Price Fixing: Our Customers are Our Enemy, Boston, Kluwer Academic Publishing, Boston.
• Development Trade and the WTO: A handbook, [2003], World Bank publications, Washington.
• Drucker P., [1995], Zarządzanie w czasach burzliwych, Nowe Wyzwania Nowe Horyzonty, Akademia Ekonomiczna Kraków, Czytelnik.
• Evenett S., Ferrari B., [2002], Developing Country Interests in International Cartel Enforcement in the 1990, World Bank, Washington.
• Fink C.A., Matoo A., Neagau I., [2002], Trade in international maritime services, World Bank Economic Review 2001, Washington.
• Friedman M., [1993], Kapitalizm i Wolność, PWE, Warszawa.
• Global Economic Prospects 2003, World Bank Report, Washington 2003.
• Hall P., [1992], Great Planning Disaster. What lessons do they hold?, Futures, Luty.
• Hallward-Driemeier M., [2003], Bilateral Investment Treaties. Do they increase FDI flows?, Global Economic Prospects 2003, World Bank, Washington.
• Johnson G.D., [1993], World Agriculture in Disarray, Harpers, London.
• Levenstein M., Suslov V, [2002], Private International Cartels and Their Effects on Developing Countries, World Development Reports 2001, Washington.
• Mattoo A., [2000], Developing Countries in the new round of GATS negotiations, World Economy 23(4).
• Mokyr J., [1994], The Lever of Riches. Technical Creativity of Economic Progress, Oxford University Press, New York.
• Ohame K., [1993], The East Asian Miracle, Harper, Washington.
• Sauve P., Wilke Ch., [2000], Investment Liberalisation in GATS, Harvard Press, NY.
• Sauve P., [2003], Collective Action Issues in Investing Rule-making, Global Economic Prospects, Washington.
• Shirley M., Walsh P., [2001], Public vs Private Ownership. The State of The Debate, World Bank Working Paper, Washington, DC.
• Sjohom F, [1996], International transfer of knowledge. The Role of International Trade and Geographic Proximity, Weltwirtschafliches Archiv, 132 (1).
• Smarzynska B., [2002], Does foreign direct investment increase the productivity of domestic firms?, World Bank Research Working Paper, Washington, DC.
• Stern N., [2001], Investment and Poverty. The Role of International Financial Institutions, Economic of Transition, 9(2).
• Solow R., [2003], Applying Growth Theory across Countries, The World Bank Economic Review, 15(2).
• Williamson J., Mahr M., [1998], A Survey of Financial Liberalization, Princeton Essays in International Finance no 211, Princeton University Press.