Preferencje help
Widoczny [Schowaj] Abstrakt
Liczba wyników
2004 | nr 10 | 43--64
Tytuł artykułu

W stronę rozszerzenia Europejskiego Banku Centralnego

Warianty tytułu
Towards Expansion of the European Central Bank
Języki publikacji
W artykule przedstawiono zmiany jakie powinny zostać wprowadzone w mechanizmie decyzyjnym EBC, w szczególności w kontekście zwiększającej się liczby krajów w strefie euro. Zaprezentowano także główne scenariusze reformy EBC proponowane w literaturze ekonomicznej.
The article presents certain drawbacks of the present decision-making system of the European Central Bank (ECB), in particular in the context of the possible entry of new countries into the euro area. It also illustrates the main scenarios of the ECB reform, as proposed in economic writings, pointing out their drawbacks and advantages. In this context, the official proposal of the reform, put forward by the ECB Governing Council is discussed, along with the progress of the legislative procedure involved with the reform. Besides, serious reservations about this proposals voiced by leading economists are taken account of. They cover, inter alia, the issues of transparency and accountability to democratic institutions, as well as the alleged lack of a serious improvement of the ECB decision-making process upon enlargement of the Economic and Monetary Union. The article also presents main theoretical considerations involved with the decision-making system of the central bank with a federal structure, in particular based on the theory of time inconsistency of decisions concerning monetary policy. The problem of making decisions within committees with a federal structure, composed of persons with heterogeneous preferences or skills, was addressed as well. (original abstract)
Opis fizyczny
  • Artus P., Wyplosz C., [2002], La Banque centrale européenne, Rapports au Conseil d'Analyse Economique, La Documentation Française.
  • Baldwin R.E., Berglöf E., Giavazzi E, Widgrén M., [2001], Preparing the ECB for Enlargement, CEPR Policy Paper nr 6.
  • Barro R.J., Gordon D.B., [1983], Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy, "Journal of Monetary Economics" nr 12.
  • Barysch K., [2002], The European Central Bank: the case for reform, [w:] Barysch K., Everts S., Grabbe H., Grant C., Hall B., Keohane D., Murray A., New Designs for Europe, Centre for European Reform, London, October 2002.
  • Berben R.-R, Bierut B. K. and Maier R, [2003], The role of regional information in the optimal composition of a committee, De Nederlandsche Bank, MEB Series 2003-8.
  • Berger H., [2002], The ECB and Euro-Area Enlargement, IMF Working Paper nr 02/175.
  • Berger H., de Haan J., Inklar R., [2003], Restructuring the ECB, CESinfo Working Paper nr 1084, November.
  • Berger H., de Haan J., Eijfinger S.C.W., [2001], Central Bank Independence: an update of theory and evidence, Journal of Economic Surveys, vol. 15, No 1.
  • Berk J.M., Bierut B., [2003], Committee structure and its implications for monetary policy decision-making, De Nederlandsche Bank, MEB Series 2003-5.
  • Berk J.M., Bierut B., [2004], The effects of learning in interactive monetary policy committees, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper TI 2004-029/2.
  • Bofinger P., [2003], Consequences of the modification of the Governing Council rules, Briefing paper for the Committee for Monetary and Economic Affairs (ECON) of the European Parliament.
  • Bogołębska J., [2003], Dylematy reformy instytucjonalnej Europejskiego Banku Centralnego, [w:] red. Bilski J., Midera A., Procesy integracyjne w gospodarce światowej. Polska w Unii Europejskiej, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego.
  • Briault C., Haldane A., King M., [1996], Independence and Accountability, Bank of England Working Paper No 49.
  • Buiter W.H., [1999], Alice in Euroland, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 37, No. 2.
  • Ciszak T., [2003], Zmiany w funkcjonowaniu EEC w kontekście rozszerzenia UE, "Biuletyn Analiz UKIE", nr 11.
  • Correia F, [2001], Monetary Policy in an Enlarged Europe, CES Discussion Paper, Nr 01.11.
  • Cothren R., [1988], Equilibrium inflation as determined by a policy committee, "Quaterly Journal of Economics" 103, Nr 2.
  • Creel J., Fitoussi J-R, [2002], How to reform the European Central Bank, Center for European Reform.
  • Cukierman A., [1992], Central Bank Strategy, Credibility and Independence, Cambridge: MIT Press.
  • de la Dehesa G., [2003], The new Governing Rules of the ECB, CEPR i OBCE mimeo.
  • Dixit A., Jensen H., [2001], Equilibrium Contracts for the Central Bank of a Monetary Union, CESifo Working Paper 400.
  • Dixit A., Jensen H., [2003], Common Agency with Rational Expectations: Theory and Application to a Monetary Union, "The Economic Journal", Vol. 113 Issue 489.
  • Egert B., [2001], Estimating the Impact of the Balassa-Samuelson Effect on Inflation during the Transition: Does It Matter in the Run-Up to EMU? The Case of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia, Contribution to "East European Transition and EU Enlargement: a Quantitative Approach", Gdańsk.
  • ECB, [2002], Press release: Governing Council prepares for enlargement, December 20th.
  • ECB, [2003], Recommendation, under Article 10.6 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank, for a Council Decision on an amendment to Article 10.2 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank, dostępne pod adresem:
  • European Parliament, [2003], Rapport sur la recommandation de décision du Conseil relative à une modification de l'article 10.2 des statuts du Système européen de banques centrales et de la Banque centrale européenne (6163/2003 - C5-0038/2003 - 2003/0803(CNS)).
  • Fahrholz C., Mohl P., [2003], EMU-enlargement and the Reshaping of Decision-making within the ECB Governing Council: A Voting-Power Analysis, Ezoneplus Working Paper No. 23.
  • Farvaque E., Stanek P., [2004], Les aspects monétaires de la Convention européenne: une évaluation critique, [w:] L'Europe en voie de Constitution, Editions Bruylant, Bruxelles.
  • Geraats P., [2001], Why adopt transparency? The publication of Central Bank Forecasts, ECB Working Paper nr 41.
  • Gerling K., Grüner H.P., Kiel A., Schulte E., [2003], Information Acquisition and Decision Making in Committees: a survey, ECB Working Paper nr 256.
  • Gros D., [2003a], Reforming the composition of the ECB Governing Council in view of enlargement: How not to do it!, Briefing paper for the Monetary Committee of the European Parliament.
  • Gros D., [2003b], Reforming the Composition of the ECB Governing Council in View of Enlargement: An Opportunity Missed!, CEPS Policy Brief nr 32.
  • Heinemann E, Huefner P.P., [2002], Is the View from the Eurotower Purely European? - National Divergence and ECB Interest Rate Policy, Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW), Mannheim, mimeo.
  • Heisenberg D., [2003], Cutting the Bank Down to Size: Efficient and Legitimate Decision-making in the European Central Bank After Enlargement, "Journal of Common Market Studies", Vol. 41, Nr3.
  • Horn G.A., [2003], Consequences of the modification of the Governing Council Rules, DIW Briefing Paper, Berlin, mimeo.
  • Issing 0., [1999], The Eurosystem: Transparent and Accountable or nWillem in Euroland", "Journal of Common Market Studies", vol. 37, No. 3, pp. 503-519.
  • Klau M. and Mihaljek D., [2003], The Balassa-Samuelson effect in central Europe: a disaggregated analysis, BIS Working Papers nr 143.
  • Kydland F.E., Prescott E.C., [1977], Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans, "Journal of Political Economy", Nr 85.
  • Maier P., [2002], Political Pressure, Rhetoric and Monetary Policy: Lessons for the European Central Bank, Edward Elgar Publishing.
  • Maier P., Bezoen S., [2002], Central Bank Bashing: The case of the European Central Bank.
  • Maier P., Hendrikx M., [2002], Implications of EMU enlargement for European monetary policy: A political economy view, De Nederlandsche Bank MEB series 2002-04.
  • Meade E. and Sheets N., [2002], Regional influences on US Monetary Policy. Some implications for Europe, Center for Economic Performance Discussion Paper 523.
  • Pollard P.S., [2003], A look inside two central banks: the European Central Bank and the Federal reserve, "Federal Reserve Bank of Saint Louis Review", January-February.
  • Randzio-Plath C., Padoa-Schioppa T, [2000], The European Central Bank: Independence and Accountability, ZEI Policy Paper BOO-16.
  • Rostowski J., [2003], When Should the Central Europeans Join EMU?, CASE Studies and Analyses, Nr 253.
  • Smidkova K., [2003], The Euro - When and How: Three Perspectives, CNB mimeo.
  • Stanek P., [2004], How to assess proposals for enlargement reform of the European Central Bank, "Revue de 1'Observatoire Francais des Conjonctures Economiques", Special Issue (April): "The new European Union Enlargement", ed. Jérôme Creel & Sandrine Levasseur.
  • Süppel R., von Hagen J., [1994], Central Bank Constitutions for Federal Monetary Unions, "European Economic Review", Nr 38.
  • Walsh C.E., [1995], Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers, American Economic Review, vol. 85, issue 1.
  • Wierzba R., [2003], Zmiany w funkcjonowaniu organów kierowniczych Europejskiego Banku Centralnego w perspektywie rozszerzenia Unii Gospodarczej i Walutowej, "Wspólnoty Europejskie", Nr 6.
  • Wojtyna A., [1998], Teoretyczne kontrowersje wokół Unii Gospodarczej i Walutowej, "Gospodarka Narodowa" - numer specjalny, czerwiec.
  • Wyplosz C., [2003], The new Eurosystem, Briefing notes to the Committee for Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament.
Typ dokumentu
Identyfikator YADDA

Zgłoszenie zostało wysłane

Zgłoszenie zostało wysłane

Musisz być zalogowany aby pisać komentarze.
JavaScript jest wyłączony w Twojej przeglądarce internetowej. Włącz go, a następnie odśwież stronę, aby móc w pełni z niej korzystać.