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2005 | nr 3 | 387--407
Tytuł artykułu

Reformy gospodarcze w krajach postsocjalistycznych w świetle badań ekonomii politycznej

Warianty tytułu
Języki publikacji
PL
Abstrakty
Niniejsza praca stanowi przegląd koncepcji dotyczących oddziaływania czynników politycznych na zróżnicowanie we wdrażaniu i podtrzymywaniu reform gospodarczych w krajach postsocjalistycznych Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej i Azji Środkowej w latach 90. Celem pracy jest pokazanie, iż mimo znacznego zróżnicowania podejść, badania pozwoliły na wyjaśnienie czynników determinujących kształt reform w krajach postsocjalistycznych oraz czynników wpływających na tempo przejścia od gospodarki centralnie sterowanej do gospodarki rynkowej. Główny nacisk w pracy położony jest na wpływ czynników społeczno-politycznych oraz ideologicznych na przekształcenia systemu gospodarczego.
Czasopismo
Rocznik
Numer
Strony
387--407
Opis fizyczny
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Typ dokumentu
Bibliografia
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