Przyczyny deficytu finansów publicznych w świetle nowej ekonomii politycznej

• Autorzy: Michał Mackiewicz

Warianty tytułu

The Public Finance Deficit From the Perspective of the New Political Economics

• Języki publikacji: PL

Abstrakty

Autor powołuje się na badania, z których wynika, że utrzymujący się deficyt finansów publicznych w Polsce wynika w znikomym stopniu z przyczyn koniunkturalnych, natomiast w głównej mierze odzwierciedla działanie czynników strukturalnych. Oznacza to, że nie jest on jedynie zjawiskiem powstającym w sposób automatyczny w czasie recesji, lecz jest świadomie wywoływany w procesie kształtowania polityki fiskalnej. Dlatego pytania zarówno o jego przyczynę, jak i o środki zaradcze powinny zdaniem autora odnosić się do mechanizmów podejmowania decyzji dotyczących polityki gospodarczej. Przy analizie wykorzystano model Perssona i Tabelliniego.

EN

The article examines mechanisms governing public finance and budget deficits in democratic countries as well as tendencies toward an increase in the overall level of public spending. The study points to the existence of two important mechanisms behind an excessive public finance deficit and the consequent accumulation of debt in democratic countries. The first mechanism is based on a situation in which decisions are made by many independent entities in a decentralized budgetary process. These entities are not fully responsible for the consequences of their decisions. The second mechanism involves the problem of proper representation of the people under the information asymmetry between voters and fiscal policy makers.

Słowa kluczowe

PL

Finanse publiczne; Polityka makroekonomiczna; Modele ekonomiczne

EN

Public finance; Macroeconomic policy; Economic models

• Czasopismo: Gospodarka Narodowa
• Rocznik: 2006
• Numer: nr 3
• Strony: 1--22

Twórcy

autor

Michał Mackiewicz

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