Układ sił w procesie decyzyjnym Rady Unii Europejskiej - wpływ rozszerzenia Unii

• Autorzy: Eric C. Mayer

Warianty tytułu

Decision Power in the European Council - the Impact of EU Enlargment

• Języki publikacji: PL

Abstrakty

Opracowanie stanowi próbę naświetlenia wpływu nowych regulacji, zawartych w Traktacie nicejskim, na proces podejmowania decyzji kwalifikowaną większością głosów w Radzie Unii Europejskiej. Niniejsza analiza skupia się na dwóch aspektach: roli nowej wagi głosów i wymaganej większości populacji w obecnej strukturze piętnastki oraz wpływie rozszerzenia Unii Europejskiej na rozkład wagi głosów w przyszłości.

EN

The Council of the European Union plays a prominent role in the decision making process of the European Community. Although the European Parliament recently gained legislative strenght by the extended application of the co-decision procedure, the Council remains the most influential body within the Community's institutional system. Accorging to the prescriptions of the act's legal base Council decisions are adopted either unanimously or by qualified majority. While power in unanimous decisions is distributed equally, the individual member state's influence diverges in qualified majority voting have always been an intensively disputed issue, the recently resurfaced in the debates oreceding the adoption of the Nice Treaty. This paper attempts to elucidate the effects of the Nice Treaty's new regulations on qualified majority voting in the Council of the European Union by applying power measure indices. The analysis will focus on two aspects: the impact of new voting weights and the required population quota in todaz's 15 member union and the consequences of enlargement on voting power in the future. After briefly reviewing problems and methods of measuring power in section two, the Community's legislative decision procedures will be described in section three. Then section four will present the contents of the Nice Treaty with respect to voting in the Council. Finally the analysis of voting power is carried out in section five. (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

PL

Proces podejmowania decyzji; Prawo WE

EN

Decision making process; European Community law

• Czasopismo: Prace Naukowe Akademii Ekonomicznej we Wrocławiu
• Rocznik: 2005
• Numer: nr 1056 Rozszerzenie Unii Europejskiej na Wschód - aspekty ekonomiczne : (ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem Polski)
• Strony: 169--193

Twórcy

autor

Eric C. Mayer

Bibliografia

• Baldwin R.E., Berglöf E., Giavazzi F., Widgren M. (2001), Nice Try: Should the Treaty of Nice be Ratified! Monitoring European Integration 11, London.
• Berg S., Perlinger Th. (2000), Connected Coalitions, Polya Sequences and Voting Power Indices, "Homo oeconomicus" vol. 16, s. 391-403.
• European Convention (2002), Legislative Procedures (Including the Budgetary Procedure)'. Current Situation, CONV 216/02 (24. July 2002).
• Pedeli S., Forte F. (2001), Voting Powers and the Efficiency of the Decision-Making Process in the European Council of Ministers, "European Journal of Law and Economics" vol. 12, s. 5-38.
• Felsenthal D.S., Machover M. (2001), The Treaty of Nice and Qualified Majority Voting, "Social Choice and Welfare" vol. 18, s. 431-464.
• Garrett G., Tsebelis G. (1999a), Why Resist the Temptation to Apply Power Indices to the European Union! "Journal of Theoretical Politics" vol. 11, s. 291-308.
• Garrett G., Tsebelis G. (1999a), More Reasons to Resist the Temptation of Power Indices in the European Union, "Journal of Theoretical Politics" vol. 11, s. 331-338.
• Holler M.J., Widgren M. (1999a), The Value of a Coalition is Power, "Homo oeconomicus" vol. 15, s. 497-511.
• Holler M.J., Widgren M. (1999b), Why Power Indices for Assessing European Union Decision-Making? "Journal of Theoretical Economics" vol. 11, s. 321-330.
• Hosli M. (1996), Coalitions and Power: Effects of Qualified Majority Voting in the Council of the European Union, "Journal of Common Market Studies" vol. 34, s. 255-273.
• Hosli M. (2000), Coalition Formation and Voting in the Council of the European Union, "Homo oeconomicus" vol. 17, s. 32-55.
• Inter-Governmental Conference (2000), Stimmenwägung im Rat [Voting weights in the Council], CONFER 4796/00 (9. November 2000).
• Kirman A., Widgren M. (1995), European Economic Decision-Making Policy: Progress or Paralysis! "Economic policy" no. 21, s. 423-460.
• Kliemt H. (1982), A Philosophical View of Power, [w:] Holler M.J. (ed.), Power, Voting, and Voting Power, Würzburg, s. 54-64.
• König Th., Bräuninger Th. (2000), Decisiveness and Inclusiveness: Two Aspects of the Intergovernmental Choice of European Voting Rules, "Homo oeconomicus" vol. 17 s. 107-123.
• Miller N.R. (1982), Power in Game Forms, Holler M.J. (ed.), Power, Voting, and Voting Power, Würzburg, s. 33-51.
• Moberg A. (2002), The Nice Treaty and Voting Rules in the Council, .Journal of Common Market Studies" vol. 40, s.259-282.
• Nurmi H. (2000), Game-Theoretical Approaches to the EU Institutions: An Overview and Evaluation, "Homo oeconomicus" vol. 16, s. 363-389.
• Nurmi H., Meskanen T. (1999), A Priori Power Measures and the Institutions of the European Union, "European Journal of Political Research" vol. 35, s. 161-179.
• Nurmi H., Meskanen T., Pajala A. (2000), Calculus of Consent in the EU Council of Ministers, "Homo oeconomicus", vol. 17, s. 85-106.
• Peters T. (1996), Voting Power after the Enlargement and Options for Decision Making in the European Union, "Aussenwirtschaft" vol. 51, s. 223-243.
• Steunenberg B. (2001), Enlargement and Institutional Reform in the European Union: Separate or Connected Issues'? "Constitutional Political Economy" vol. 12, s. 351-370.
• Steunenberg B., Schmidtchen D., Koboldt Ch. (1999),: Strategic Power in the European Union -Evaluating the distribution of Power in Policy Games, .Journal of Theoretical Politics" vol. 11, s. 339-366.
• Theurl Th., Meyer E.G. (2001), Institutionelle Grundlagen der Europäischen Union, integrationspolitische Strategien und aktuelle Entwicklungsperspektiven [Institutional Foundations of the European Union, Integration Strategies and Current Perspectives on Future Development], [w:] Theurl Th., Ohr R. (Hrsg.),: Kompendium Europäische Wirtschaftspolitik [Compendium European Economic Policy], München.
• Tsebelis G., Yataganas X. (2002), Veto Players and Decision-Making in the EU After Nice: Policy Stability and Bureaucratic/Judicial Discretion, .Journal of Common Market Studies" vol. 40, s. 283-307.
• Widgren M. (1995), Probabilistic Voting Power in the EU Council: The Cases of Trade Policy and Social Regulation, "Scandinavian Journal of Economics" vol. 97, s. 345-356.
• Wilming C. (1995), Institutionelle Konsequenzen einer Erweiterung der Europäischen Union [Institutional consequences of European Union enlargement], Baden-Baden.
• Winkler G.M. (1998), Coalition-Sensitive Voting Power in the Council of Ministers: The Case of Eastern Enlargement, "Journal of Common Market Studies" vol. 36, s. 391-404.