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2005 | nr 1064 Pozyskiwanie wiedzy i zarządzanie wiedzą | 353--366
Tytuł artykułu

Can One Learn Too Much for One's Own Good? Rational Choice, Learning, and Their Interplay

Warianty tytułu
Języki publikacji
EN
Abstrakty
EN
Authors have considered a learning problem, which occurs when changes in the knowledge system of a firm (learning) alter its business objectives (preference). Grounds for evaluating learning may become known only after the learning. The article presents a review of current learning theories and the rational choice.
W artykule rozważany jest problem uczenia, który obejmuje zmiany systemu wiedzy firmy wpływające na modyfikację działania tej firmy a zarazem jej preferencje. Podkreślono iż, podstawy tych zmian mogą zostać rozpoznane dopiero po uczeniu. Zaprezentowano krótki przegląd obecnych teorii uczenia i racjonalnego wyboru.
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Bibliografia
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