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2006 | nr 9 | 77--106
Tytuł artykułu

Osiem pytań na temat korupcji

Warianty tytułu
Języki publikacji
W artykule omówiono osiem często zadawanych pytań, które dotyczą korupcji w sektorze publicznym: 1) Czym jest korupcja. 2) W których krajach korupcja kwitnie najbardziej. 3) Jakie cechy wspólne mają kraje o największej korupcji. 4) Jaka jest skala zjawiska korupcji. 5) Czy wyższe pensje urzędników zmniejszają korupcję. 6) Czy konkurencja zmniejsza korupcję. 7) Dlaczego ostatnio powiodło się tak niewiele prób zwalczenia korupcji. 8) Czy korupcja negatywnie wpływa na wzrost gospodarczy.
Opis fizyczny
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