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2005 | nr 56 | 81--104
Tytuł artykułu

Odpowiedzialność banków centralnych w krajach Europy Środkowej

Treść / Zawartość
Warianty tytułu
Accountability of Central Banks in Central Europe
Języki publikacji
Przedstawiono rozważania dotyczące odpowiedzialności banku centralnego oraz wspomniano o badaniach poruszających to zagadnienie. Wyjaśniono pojęcie odpowiedzialności oraz scharakteryzowano jej kontekście pojęć transparentności i autonomii. Omówiono odpowiedzialność przedmiotową i podmiotową określające zakres kompetencji banku centralnego. Szczegółowo zanalizowano odpowiedzialność podmiotową w sześciu krajach Europy Środkowej: Bułgarii, Czechach, Polsce, Rumunii, Słowacji i Węgrzech.
The first part of this paper discusses the problem of proper extent of a central bank's accountability. The sought-after solution will be a central bank which is autonomous and accountable. The second part defines characteristics of accountability, on the assumption that accountability acts 'ex post' and the subject under analysis is an autonomous central bank. Owing to long time-lags in observing results of monetary policy the accountability of a central bank must be supplemented with elements of transparency. Therefore, accountability is determined by transparency of decisions as well as mechanisms of monitoring and controlling. It is recognised that the subject towards which accountability is to be exercised is a parliament and, in general, society. The third part contains a comparison of accountability in 6 countries of Central Europe (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia). Basically, regulations and practice of accountability is similar in these countries. Accountability is mainly based on obligations consisting in providing information to the public, parliament and government. Even if precise forms of discharging such information obligations may vary, their basic range is identical. Although issues regarding accountability and transparency are not defined so precisely by the EU's laws as the autonomy of a central bank, the practice pursued in this sphere by the central banks of analysed countries approximates that of the European Central Bank. In part this may be regarded as an indirect result of regulations governing autonomy but in part it does not result from any formal obligations. The strengthening of accountability of central banks could move in two directions. First, dialogue with parliaments may be intensified (at least following the example of the European Parliament). Secondly, a more difficult and probably more controversial solution would be to appoint a separate, autonomous entity which would have rights of control in relation to the activities of a central bank. (original abstract)
Opis fizyczny
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