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2005 | nr 56 | 223--247
Tytuł artykułu

Zastosowanie teorii gier do badania koordynacji polityki pieniężnej i polityki fiskalnej

Warianty tytułu
The Application of Game Theory for Studying Coordination of Monetary and Fiscal Policy
Języki publikacji
PL
Abstrakty
Wzajemne zależności między polityką pieniężną i fiskalną oraz ich wpływ na stabilność cen stanowią przedmiot rozważań zawartych w niniejszym artykule. Autor podejmuje próbę wskazania na możliwość zastosowania teorii gier do badania koordynacji obu tych typów polityki i formułuje wnioski, waloryzujące modele poszczególnych gier.
EN
Since the beginning of the 1980s, interactions of monetary and fiscal policy have been revisited and carefully analysed. Due to growing importance of price stability and prob­lems with achieving it, special attention has been paid to the coordination of monetary and fiscal policy. Such coordination has been treated as crucial to a stable level of prices. Common method for considering these issues is game theory. The paper has two aims: to survey game theory in the context of monetary-fiscal interactions and to draw conclu­sions from specific games between the central bank and the government. First, I describe premises of coordination. Second, I bring closer basic concepts of game theory. Third I characterise chosen models of monetary-fiscal games. Then, I asses usefulness of game-theory approach in analysing economic policy and present conclusions, which monetary-fiscal games bring for the policy coordination. (original abstract)
Rocznik
Numer
Strony
223--247
Opis fizyczny
Twórcy
Bibliografia
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Typ dokumentu
Bibliografia
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Identyfikator YADDA
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