Regulacja ekonomiczna jako teoria grup interesu

• Autorzy: Bożena Borkowska

Warianty tytułu

The Economic Regulation as a Theory of Interest Groups.

• Języki publikacji: PL

Abstrakty

Zaprezentowano ekonomiczne teorie regulacji zaproponowane przez przedstawicieli szkoły chicagowskiej (model regulacji ekonomicznej Stiglera, koncepcja Peltzmana, model Beckera), a także wskazano możliwości i ograniczenia eksplanacyjne omawianych modeli.

EN

Beginning with G. Stigler (1971) and continuing with S. Peltzman (1976) and G. Becker (1983, 1985), the Chicago School has challenged the public interest theory by offering economic theories of regulation often called economic theories of interest groups. The mains theses and implications of these theories are discussed in this article. (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

PL

Mechanizmy polityki rynkowej; Grupa interesu; Modele ekonomiczne; Chicagowska szkoła ekonomii

EN

Market policy mechanisms; Interest group; Economic models; Chicago School

• Czasopismo: Prace Naukowe Akademii Ekonomicznej we Wrocławiu
• Rocznik: 2005
• Numer: nr 1090 Działania zbiorowe w teorii i praktyce
• Strony: 131--140

Twórcy

autor

Bożena Borkowska

Bibliografia

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