Wybór formuły przetargowej na skarbowe papiery wartościowe

• Autorzy: Arkadiusz Babczuk , Andrzej Dudek

Warianty tytułu

The Forms of Auctioning Treasury Securities

• Języki publikacji: PL

Abstrakty

Przedmiotem niniejszego opracowania jest prezentacja konsekwencji zastosowania przetargu z ceną jednolitą oraz przetargu z cenami zróżnicowanymi w warunkach polskich. W pracy wykorzystano metodę badawczą zaproponowaną przez Kim, Oh, Ryu [2004], którzy to autorzy podjęli próbę oceny zasadności zmiany formatu przetargowego w Korei Południowej [Kim, Oh, Ryu, 2004]. Badanie to ma charakter wstępny. Uwzględniono w nim jedynie dwa typy instrumentów skarbowych: dwuletnie obligacje zerokuponowe oraz roczne bony skarbowe. W kolejnych opracowaniach pula analizowanych skarbowych papierów wartościowych zostanie rozszerzona. Autorzy są także świadomi ograniczeń w implementacji wybranej metody wynikających z ograniczonej płynności publicznego elektronicznego rynku skarbowych papierów wartościowych. (abstrakt oryginalny)

EN

The article discusses methods used in auctioning Treasury securities in Poland. Treasury auctions are widely used by authorities responsible for the management of public debt. The authors of the paper set out to identify auction mechanisms that maximize the expected income of the seller. The paper shows the effects of the single- and multiple-price auction systems in Poland. The authors use a research method developed by G.R. Kim, S. Oh and K. Ryu. Babczuk and Dudek conclude that the single-price auction system is safer for the issuer because revenue from single-price auctions is in most cases higher than that generated from multiple-price auction systems. At the same time, due to imperfect research methods, especially in estimating the issuer’s revenue from a single-price auction system, further in-depth studies are needed into methods for carrying out auctions for T-securities in Poland, the authors conclude. (original absrtact)

Słowa kluczowe

PL

Papiery wartościowe; Przetargi; Konkurencyjność; Bony skarbowe

EN

Securities; Tenders; Competitiveness; Treasury bill

• Czasopismo: Gospodarka Narodowa
• Rocznik: 2007
• Numer: nr 10
• Strony: 85--107

Twórcy

autor

Arkadiusz Babczuk

autor

Andrzej Dudek

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