Modele zadłużenia publicznego odwołujące się do typu instytucji plitycznych

• Autorzy: Arkadiusz Babczuk

Warianty tytułu

Models of public debt based on national political institutions

• Języki publikacji: PL

Abstrakty

Celem artykułu jest prezentacja modeli zadłużenia publicznego odwołujących się do typu instytucji politycznych, tj. reguł oraz standardów kształtujących system polityczny danego państwa. Mogą one wpływać na wybory decydentów oraz charakter ich wzajemnych interakcji. Modele odwołujące się do typu instytucji politycznych akcentują znaczenie konfliktów pomiędzy decydentami w zakresie podziału korzyści oraz obciążeń fiskalnych wynikających z aktywnośći państwa.

EN

The paper presents models of public debt where their level and dynamics is related to different national political institutions. These institutions may influence public choices of political decision-makers and the character of their interactions. Differences between national political institutions in different countries may explain cross-country differences in budget deficits and public debt. The paper surveys a number of models, including models of fragmented governments, the common pool model or model of geographically dispersed interests. (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

PL

Dług publiczny; Polityczne aspekty ekonomii; Zadłużenie; Teoria wyboru publicznego

EN

Public debt; Political aspects of economics; Indebtedness; Public choice theory

• Czasopismo: Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny
• Rocznik: 2007
• Numer: nr 3
• Strony: 135--151

Twórcy

autor

Arkadiusz Babczuk

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