Geneza i znaczenie metod eksperymentalnych w ekonomii

• Autorzy: Sławomir Kalinowski

Warianty tytułu

The Origin and Importance of Experimental Methods in Economics

• Języki publikacji: PL

Abstrakty

Celem artykułu jest prezentacja kierunków rozwoju ekonomii eksperymentalnej w ujęciu historycznym oraz wykazanie fundamentalnego znaczenia teorii gier dla jej genezy. Przedstawiono przykłady pozytywnego wpływu wyników eksperymentów na rozwój teorii gier oraz znaczenie ekonomii eksperymentalnej dla rozwoju teorii użyteczności.

EN

The article is an attempt to introduce the most important achievements of experimental economics to the Polish economic literature. The works from the early stage of this branch of science are widely presented in this type of literature. The aim of the article is to prove the fundamental importance of the game theory for the origin of the experimental economics. Simultaneously, the author's intention is to point out the positive influence of experiment results on the game theory development. The presentation of chosen, significant achievements of the described science branches should prove its importance for the development of economic theory. (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

PL

Ekonomia; Eksperyment badawczy; Teoria oczekiwanej użyteczności; Teoria gier; Struktura rynku; Ekonomia eksperymentalna

EN

Economics; Scientific experiment; Expected utility theory; Game theory; Market structure; Experimental economics

• Czasopismo: Zeszyty Naukowe / Akademia Ekonomiczna w Poznaniu
• Rocznik: 2006
• Numer: nr 77
• Strony: 88--107

Twórcy

autor

Sławomir Kalinowski

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