Do Corporate Governance and Ownership Determine Dividend Policy in Poland?

• Autorzy: Oskar Kowalewski , Ivan Stetsyuk , Oleksandr Talavera

Warianty tytułu

Czy nadzór właścicielski oraz struktura własności mają wpływ na politykę dywidendową w Polsce?

• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

The goal of this paper is twofold. First, we explore the determinants of the dividend policy in Poland. Second, we test whether ownership and corporate governance practices determine the dividend policy in the non-financial companies listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange. In order to test the impact of corporate governance we compose, for the first time, quantitative measures on the quality of the corporate governance standards for 110 non-financial companies listed on the WSE. Our results suggest that ownership as well as the increase in corporate governance standards controlling for other determinants bring about a statistically significant increase in the dividend payout ratio. The findings are based on the period 1998-2004. (original abstract)

W artykule tym zostały postawione dwa zadania badawcze. Po pierwsze, przeanalizowano został wpływ zestawów czynników, które mogą decydować o wypłacie dywidendy w spółkach giełdowych. Po drugie przeanalizowano wpływ nadzoru właścicielskiego oraz struktury własności w spółkach giełdowych na wypłatę dywidendy. W tym celu, po raz pierwszy, przygotowana została miara oceniająca jakość nadzoru właścicielskiego w 110 spółkach giełdowych notowanych na warszawskiej Giełdzie Papierów Wartościowych w latach 1998-2004. Uzyskane wyniki badań empirycznych wskazują, że struktura własności oraz nadzór właścicielski mają statystycznie istotne znaczenie dla polityki dywidendową spółek giełdowych w Polsce. (abstrakt oryginalny)

Słowa kluczowe

EN

Corporate governance; Ownership structure; Stock market companies; Dividend; Dividend policy

PL

Ład korporacyjny; Struktura własnościowa; Spółki giełdowe; Dywidenda; Polityka dywidend

• Czasopismo: Bank i Kredyt
• Rocznik: 2007
• Numer: nr 11-12
• Strony: 60--86

Twórcy

autor

Oskar Kowalewski

autor

Ivan Stetsyuk

autor

Oleksandr Talavera

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