Mikroekonomiczne przesłanki art. 82 TWE

• Autorzy: Kamil Kiljański

Warianty tytułu

Microeconomic Premises for the Article 82 Reform

• Języki publikacji: PL

Abstrakty

Celem artykułu jest zasygnalizowanie szeregu wybranych zaleceń, jakie nauka ekonomii może zaoferować w ramach reformy art. 82. Zaprezentowano ekonomiczną problematykę zjawiska pozycji dominującą. Druga część artykułu dotyczy cen drapieżnych, jako najbardziej reprezentatywnego nadużycia pozycji dominującej o charakterze wykluczającym.

EN

The article discusses selected economic issues in the context of the Article 82 review (prohibition of an abuse of dominant position in the EC Treaty). It is composed of two principal parts, the first one addressing the economic meaning of the legal term 'dominant position'. In doing this, the author equates dominant position with significant market power and, basing upon such as assumption, argues that: (1) the existence of dominance is neither necessary nor sufficient for finding an abuse and (2) it is perfectly possible for more than one firm to be singly dominant in a given antitrust market. Finally, two fallacies related to market definition in Article 82 investigations are discussed (cellophane fallacy and product differentiation). In the second part of the article the author contrasts the current enforcement rules on predatory pricing with more economically sound policy. In particular, the current policy exhibits an excessive concern with costs and could lead to either under- or over-enforcement. It would be more reasonable for a policy to constitute of three evidentiary steps: of exclusion, recoupment and profit sacrifice. (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

PL

Konkurencja; Polityka konkurencji; Prawo konkurencji; Prawo WE

EN

Competition; Competition policy; Competition law; European Community law

• Czasopismo: Studia Europejskie / Centrum Europejskie Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego
• Rocznik: 2007
• Numer: nr 1
• Strony: 93--109

Twórcy

autor

Kamil Kiljański

Bibliografia

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