Niezależność banku centralnego a wyborczy cykl koniunkturalny

• Autorzy: Wiesława Przybylska-Kapuścińska , Michał Skopowski

Warianty tytułu

The Central Bank Independence and the Political Business Cycle

• Języki publikacji: PL

Abstrakty

Przeprowadzono analizę znaczenia niezależności banku centralnego dla deficytów budżetowych powstających w kontekście politycznego cyklu koniunkturalnego w ośmiu krajach. Wybrano kraje należących od niedawna do Unii Europejskiej.

EN

Despite the fact that J. Maloney, A. C. Pickering, K. Hadri (2003) and B. Neyapti (2003) in their research tried to prove that the central banks independence is able to reduce negative effects of a political business cycle, such as higher budget deficit in the year of elections for example, the case of EU-8 countries suggest that their conclusions were not correct. Especially in Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary the budget deficits were higher when the central bank was independent in a Maastricht Treaty sense. It seems that other institutional factors, like provisions related to making amendments to a budget draft or an exchange rate regime, are more important for reducing budget deficits. The Estonian case also confirms this conclusion. (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

PL

Banki centralne; Niezależność banku centralnego; Cykl koniunkturalny; Wahania koniunkturalne; Deficyt budżetowy

EN

Central banks; Central bank independence; Business cycles; Business fluctuations; Budget deficit

• Czasopismo: Zeszyty Naukowe / Akademia Ekonomiczna w Poznaniu
• Rocznik: 2008
• Numer: nr 103
• Strony: 188--208

Twórcy

autor

Wiesława Przybylska-Kapuścińska

autor

Michał Skopowski

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