Warianty tytułu
Underinvestment or Overinvestment of the Firm a Sign of Agency Costs of Debt?
Języki publikacji
Abstrakty
W artykule przedstawiono zjawiska niedoinwestowania i przeinwestowania przedsiębiorstwa korzystającego z długu. Omówiono dwa sposoby interpretacji tych problemów: podejście wykorzystujące pojęcie opcji realnych oraz sposób oparty na analizie zaktualizowanej wartości przepływów pieniężnych, a także towarzyszących im miar kosztów agencji długu.
One of the consequences of debt financing in a firm is the agency costs of debt. The source of the agency costs is the conflict of interests between the equityholders and bondholders and its symptoms are the assets substitution, Underinvestment or overinvestment and the direct wealth transfer from bondholders to shareholders. The main focus is on the investment problem. Two important ways of this subject's analysis have been presented: the contingent claims models, in which investment opportunites are evaluated with a real options approach and the cash flow analysis based on the stochastic simulations. The analysis of the recent literature enables us to formulate the relationship between the underinvestment or overinvestment problem and the agency costs of debt. (original abstract)
Rocznik
Numer
Strony
150--163
Opis fizyczny
Twórcy
Bibliografia
- Heinkel R., Zechner J. [1990], The Role of Debt and Preferred Stock as a Solution to Adverse Investment Decisions, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, vol. 25.
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- Jensen M., Meckling W.H. [1976], Theory of the Firm, Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial Economies, vol. 3.
- Lyandres E., Zhdanov A. [2005], Underinvestment or Overinvestment: the Effect of Financial Leverage on Investment, Working Paper.
- Mauer D.C., Ott S.H. [2000], Agency Costs, Underinvestment and Optimal Capital Structure: The Effect of Growth Options to Expand, w: M. J. Brennan, L. Trigeorgis (red.), Project Flexibility, Agency and Competition, Oxford University Press, New York.
- Mauer D.C., Sarkar S. [2001], Real Options, Agency Conflicts, and Financial Policy, Working Paper.
- Myers S. [1977], Determinants of Corporate Borrowing, Journal of Financial Economies, vol.5.
- Myers S., Majluf N. [1983], Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have Information Investors Do Not Have, Journal of Financial Economies, vol. 13.
- Narayanan M.F. [1986], Debt Versus Equity Under Asymmetric Information, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, vol. 23.
- Parrino R., Weisbach M.S. [1999], Measuring Investment Distortions Arising front Stockholder - Bondholder Conflicts, Journal of Financial Economies, vol. 53.
Typ dokumentu
Bibliografia
Identyfikatory
Identyfikator YADDA
bwmeta1.element.ekon-element-000152383924