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2006 | nr 1 | 153--163
Tytuł artykułu

The Limits of Agency Theory as a Framework for the Analisys of Corporate Governance

Warianty tytułu
Języki publikacji
EN
Abstrakty
EN
This paper provides a critical analysis of the agency theory approach to corporate governance and highlights the benefits, and challenges, of adopting a wider theoretical framework. We point out the unrealism of many of the assumptions of agency theory that have been highlighted by economic sociologists, and we propose a wider theoretical framework for the analysis of corporate governance that incorporated ideas from stakeholder theory, stewardship theory, the theory of trusteeship and ideas derived from institutional economics. (original abstract)
W artykule przedstawiono problem teorii agencji oraz jej krytyczną analizę. Jest ona jedną z najpopularniejszych koncepcji teoretycznych ładu korporacyjnego. Opisano również teorię grup interesów jako podejście konkurencyjne do teorii agencji.
Rocznik
Numer
Strony
153--163
Opis fizyczny
Bibliografia
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Typ dokumentu
Bibliografia
Identyfikatory
Identyfikator YADDA
bwmeta1.element.ekon-element-000153700208

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