Rola instytucji fiskalnych w ograniczeniu nadmiernego deficytu budżetu państwa

• Autorzy: Joanna Działo

Warianty tytułu

Role of Fiscal Institutions in Limiting the Budget Deficit Bias.

• Języki publikacji: PL

Abstrakty

Przedstawiono rodzaje reguł fiskalnych, jakie mogą być wykorzystywane przy podejmowaniu prób ograniczania deficytu budżetowego. Dokonano przeglądu badań empirycznych analizujących wpływ poszczególnych reguł na politykę fiskalną prowadzoną w badanych krajach. Zanalizowano związek pomiędzy systemem wyborczym stosowanym w danym kraju, a jego wpływem na kształt prowadzonej w tym kraju polityki fiskalnej.

EN

The political factors have long been seen as important determinants of governing the public finance in developed economies. Agency problem, common pool problem as well as asymmetry Information result in tendencies toward an increase in public spending, budget deficit and public debt. There exist some instruments that may limit the scope of influence of the mentioned above political factors on the fiscal policy. The most important ones are fiscal institutions, and two of them are presented in this paper: fiscal rules and electoral system. This study explores the linkage between the design of fiscal rules and the electoral system and the fiscal performance in democratic countries. The first part of the study presents different forms of fiscal rules (balanced budget laws, debt ceilings, borrowing constraints, public debt constraints) and their possible impact on fiscal discipline. The next part refers to the two main forms of electoral systems: majority system and proportional system. The author present the pros and cons of each solution from the perspective of their impact on fiscal discipline. The study is supported by the empirical evidence. Overall, the evidence suggests that fiscal institutions may have a significant effect on the capability of the governments to gain control over the public finance. Empirical results show that fiscal rules may be an important instrument of enhancing fiscal discipline, especially balanced budget laws. In the countries where balanced budget laws do not exist, debt ceilings may become a good substitute. Similarly, the shape of electoral rules plays an important role in determining fiscal outcomes through their impact on the form of government. (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

PL

Polityka finansowa państwa; Polityka podatkowa; Prawo wyborcze; System wyborczy; Wydatki publiczne

EN

State financial policy; Tax policy; Election law; Voting system; Public expenditures

• Czasopismo: Gospodarka w Praktyce i Teorii
• Rocznik: 2008
• Numer: nr 4
• Strony: 21--35

Twórcy

autor

Joanna Działo

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