Ceny drapieżne jako narzędzie rywalizacji

• Autorzy: Hanna Trojanowska

Warianty tytułu

Predatory Prices as a Competition Tool

• Języki publikacji: PL

Abstrakty

Przedstawiono istotę cen drapieżnych i cen zaporowych. Przybliżono dyskusje toczące się wokół problemu cen drapieżnych. Omówiono uregulowania prawne oraz japońskie i amerykańskie podejście do cen drapieżnych. Zamieszczono interpretację zjawiska w modelu Tabety i Wanga.

EN

The predatory prices are applied by means of a price lowering followed by a price raise. This operation allows eliminating of competitors and gaining the market advantage. For the Chicago school this strategy is irrational. On the other part, the post-Chicago school by utilising the game theory sees a potential to increase profits in the predators' behaviour. Despite the dispute, in many countries the application of predatory prices is illegal. In the USA many lawsuits took place, in which the American companies accused their Japanese competitors of utilising this unfair strategy when seeking the market monopolisation. A new argument has been raised in the economic discussion on predatory pricing that urges the senselessness of those accusations: it is not the application of illegal practices, but the cultural differences in approaching the business targets that are the source of the Japanese success and the advantages over the Americans. The present paper delivers a polemic to this opinion.(original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

PL

Ceny; Zarządzanie cenami; Strategia cen

EN

Prices; Administered prices; Pricing strategies

• Czasopismo: Zeszyty Naukowe / Szkoła Główna Handlowa. Kolegium Gospodarki Światowej
• Rocznik: 2009
• Numer: nr 25
• Strony: 176--190

Twórcy

autor

Hanna Trojanowska

• Szkoła Główna Handlowa w Warszawie, doktorant

Bibliografia

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