Wielokrotne mandaty w spółkach akcyjnych

• Autorzy: Marek Pawlak

Warianty tytułu

Interlocking Directorates in Joint Stock Companies

• Języki publikacji: PL

Abstrakty

W artykule przedstawiono wyniki badań zjawiska wielokrotnych mandatów (interlocking directorates) w spółkach akcyjnych zarejestrowanych w Polsce. Najwięcej wielokrotnych mandatów mają członkowie organów firm ubezpieczeniowych i funduszy, najmniej przedsiębiorstw produkcyjnych i fabryk. (abstrakt oryginalny)

EN

The article presents results of investigation of interlocking directorates in joint stock companies registered in Poland. The interlocking directorates were found most often among board’s members of insurance companies and funds; most rarely they were common among representatives of manufacturing enterprises. (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

PL

Spółki akcyjne; Rada nadzorcza spółki; Organy zarządzające spółek; Zarząd; Akcjonariusz

EN

Joint stock companies; Supervisory board of the company; Managing bodies of companies; Board of directors; Shareholders

• Czasopismo: Ekonomika i Organizacja Przedsiębiorstwa
• Rocznik: 2009
• Numer: nr 3
• Strony: 49--58

Twórcy

autor

Marek Pawlak

Bibliografia

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