Tradeoff between Equity and Efficiency in Revenue Sharing Contracts

• Autorzy: Bogumił Kamiński , Maciej Łatek
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

We investigate the problem of setting revenue sharing rules in a team production environment with a principal and two agents. We assume that the project output is binary and that the principal can observe the level of agents' actual effort, but does not know the production function. Identifying conditions that ensure the efficiency of the revenue sharing rule, we show that the rule of equal percentage markups can lead to in ation of project costs. This result provides an explanation for project cost overruns other than untruthful cost reporting. (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

EN

Moral hazard; Inflation costs; Project management; Revenue

PL

Pokusa nadużycia; Koszty inflacji; Zarządzanie projektem; Przychody

• Czasopismo: Central European Journal of Economic Modelling and Econometrics (CEJEME)
• Rocznik: 2010
• Tom: 2
• Numer: nr 1
• Strony: 1--16

Twórcy

autor

Bogumił Kamiński

• Warsaw School of Economics, Poland

autor

Maciej Łatek

• George Mason University, Stany Zjednoczone

Bibliografia

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Identyfikatory

DOI

10.24425/cejeme.2010.119317