Konkurencja między partiami politycznymi a polityka gospodarcza

• Autorzy: Jan Fałkowski

Warianty tytułu

Competition Between Political Parties and Economic Policy

• Języki publikacji: PL

Abstrakty

Ten artykuł ma służyć dwóm podstawowym celom. Po pierwsze, ma on za zadanie przedstawić najnowsze osiągnięcia teorii ekonomii, gdy chodzi o analizę powiązań miedzy konkurencja polityczną a polityką gospodarczą i jej efektami. Po drugie, podejmuje on próbę krótkiego przeglądu najnowszej literatury empirycznej z tej dziedziny. W ten sposób niniejsze opracowanie może okazać się użyteczne jako wstęp do bardziej szczegółowej analizy rozstrzygnięć zapadających na styku polityki i gospodarki, czy to w Polsce, czy na świecie. (fragment tekstu)

EN

The paper is an attempt to reconstruct and systemise the views of economists on the relationships between the intensity of competition between political parties and economic policy performed by the government. In the first part, in the context of concepts and findings of new institutional economics and new political economy, the author describes the reasons why political competition has become subject of interest for economists. The next part presents the most significant economic theories that explain the links between economic decisions taken by the government and various aspects of political competition. The discussion includes i.a. the model of median voter, questions related to political rent-seeking, and social control over political elites. The last part of the paper gives a brief review of empirical analyses related to the topic. (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

PL

Polityka gospodarcza; Partie polityczne; Polityczne aspekty ekonomii; Konkurencja

EN

Economic policy; Political parties; Political aspects of economics; Competition

• Czasopismo: Ekonomista
• Rocznik: 2011
• Numer: nr 1
• Strony: 55--72

Twórcy

autor

Jan Fałkowski

• Uniwersytet Warszawski

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