Regionally Heterogeneous Preferences and Voting on an Unemployment Insurance : Proportional vs. Majority Vote

• Autorzy: Ivo Bischoff , Stefan Schafer

Warianty tytułu

Regionalnie niejednorodne preferencje i głosowanie nad ubezpieczeniem przed bezrobociem : głosowanie proporcjonalne a większościowe

• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

One of the most important questions in the field of fiscal federalism is how to account for regional heterogeneity in preferences. On the one hand, Oates' decentralization theorem makes a plausible recommendation: "the level of welfare will always be at least as high (and typically higher) if Pareto-efficient levels of consumption of the good are provided in each jurisdiction than if any single, uniform level of consumption is maintained across all jurisdictions". In addition, Tullock points out that the frustration cost of those who arc, in an election, outvoted by the majority will be lower in the case of decentralization. On the other hand, regional spillovers and economies of scale strengthen the case of centralization. Whenever economics of scale or spillovers are large, centralization is recommended. Yet a centralized solution can draw on different mechanisms - the proportional and the majoritarian voting rule - to aggregate individual preferences. This paper will show how the two mechanisms differ in the results they produce when used to decide about the main parameters of an unemployment insurance (UI). Section 2 introduces the basic concept of an UI and interregional heterogeneity in preferences. Section 3 compares the decisions made under the proportional and the majoritarian voting rule, respectively. Section 4 illustrates implications of different voting rules for different forms of interregional heterogeneity in preferences. (fragment of text)

W artykule przedstawiono problematykę politycznych decyzji, dotyczących podstawowych parametrów ustalania ubezpieczenia od bezrobocia na poziomie centralnym. Porównano skutki, wynikające z większościowego i proporcjonalnego głosowania. Wyniki stopy zastąpienia bezrobocia zależą od rozłożenia indywidualnych preferencji w ramach i pomiędzy okręgami wyborczymi. (abstrakt oryginalny)

Słowa kluczowe

EN

Unemployment insurance; Voting decisions; Economics of choice

PL

Ubezpieczenie od bezrobocia; Decyzje wyborcze; Ekonomia wyboru

• Czasopismo: Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Oeconomica
• Rocznik: 2006
• Tom: 197 Przemiany w finansach publicznych w Polsce po wstąpieniu do Unii Europejskiej
• Strony: 19--26

Twórcy

autor

Ivo Bischoff

• University of Giessen, Germany

autor

Stefan Schafer

• University of Giessen, Germany

Bibliografia

• I. Bischoff, Party Competition in a Heterogeneous Electorate: the Role of Dominant Issue Voters, "Public Choice", forthcoming.
• I. Bischoff, S. Schaefer, Unemployment Insurance and Micro-level Labor Market Policy in a Federalist State, Paper presented at the University of Lodz, Poland April 23, 2004
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• D. Mueller, Public Choice III, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2003
• M. Neugart, Unemployment Insurance: the Role of Electoral Systems and Regional Labor Markets, Paper presented at the EPCS-Conference in Berlin, 2004
• W. E. Oates, Fiscal Federalism, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York-Chicago 1972, p. 54
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• G. Saint-Paul, Exploring the Political Economy of Labour Market Institutions, "Economic Policy" 1996, vol. 23, p. 265-315
• G. Tullock, Federalism: Problems of Scale, "Public Choice" 1969, vol. 6 (1), p. 19-29
• R. Wright, The Redistributive Roles of Unemployment Insurance and the Dynamics of Voting, "Journal of Public Economics" 1986, vol. 31, p. 377-399