Schemat arbitrażowy Nasha jako narzędzie wskazania rozwiązania koperacyjnego w modelu negocjacji dotyczacych ceł

• Autorzy: Sławomir Kalinowski

Warianty tytułu

Nash Bargaining Solution as a Toll of Indicating a Cooperatine Solution in Tariff Rates Negotiation.

• Języki publikacji: PL

Abstrakty

Przedmiotem zainteresowania atrykułu są gry kooperacyjne, a celem artykuły jest ocena możliwości użycia schematu arbitrażowego Nasha dotyczącego rozwiązania koperacyjnego przy rozwiązywaniu konfliktór interesów przy negocjacjach stawek celnych w handlu między dwoma państwami lub ugrupowaniami(fragment tekstu)

EN

The article is an example of studies on the applications of cooperative solutions in solving the bargaining situations in economy. One of such situations is tariff rates negotiations between two countries or free trade areas. The purpose of the article was to show the possibility of using Nash bargaining scheme to find the cooperative solution in a described bargaining situation. The situation was about determining tariff rates in trade exchange between two countries. Based on the mechanism of a simple model, utility functions were built for both parties. These functions depended on the players' own strategy and the strategy of the negotiating partners. The result was a game, in which tariff rates became the strategies, countries participating in trade exchange were the players, and the pay offs were utility values for concrete pairs of strategies. Calculations, which were made, proved that using Nash solution lets us indicate the cooperative solution in a chosen bargaining situation. Their outcome confirmed a hypothetical indication based on the analysis of pay offs matrices. In addition, the application of Nash bargaining solution enabled the author to determine pairs of strategies of optimal threats, which can be used in case the players give up the cooperative solution. (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

PL

Cła; Negocjacje; Handel

EN

Tariffs; Negotiations; Trade

• Czasopismo: Zeszyty Naukowe / Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny w Poznaniu
• Rocznik: 2010
• Numer: nr 132
• Strony: 76--92

Twórcy

autor

Sławomir Kalinowski

• Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny w Poznaniu

Bibliografia

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