Państwo jako podmiot kreujący poszukiwanie i pozyskiwanie renty

• Autorzy: Marian Turek
• Języki publikacji: PL

Abstrakty

W artykule omówiono zagadnienie tworzenia renty i pozyskiwania renty. Zaprezentowano ekonomiczne koszty pozyskiwania renty oraz pozyskiwanie renty w działaniu. Na koniec przeanalizowano zależność pomiędzy zorganizowanymi grupami interesów a modelem pozyskiwania renty.

Słowa kluczowe

PL

Teoria regulacji; Rola państwa w gospodarce; Ład społeczno-gospodarczy

EN

Theory of regulation; States' role in economy; Social-economic order

• Czasopismo: Prace Naukowe / Akademia Ekonomiczna w Katowicach
• Rocznik: 2004
• Tom: Dokonania współczesnej myśli ekonomicznej - teorie nieliberalne wobec ekonomicznej roli państwa a polityka społeczno-ekonomiczna
• Strony: 157--172

Twórcy

autor

Marian Turek

• Uniwersytet Gdański

Bibliografia

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