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2011 | nr 2/1 | 33--53
Tytuł artykułu

Corporate Governance after the Financial Crisis : Institutional Investors and the Stewardship Function

Warianty tytułu
Języki publikacji
One of the ways in which corporate governance may be improved is through greater engagement by shareholders with the companies in which they invest. The recent financial crisis has provided fresh momentum to calls for greater shareholder activism, with the notion of 'stewardship' gaining greater prominence. In the UK this resulted in the launch of a UK Stewardship Code in July 2010, the first of its kind in the world, targeted at UK-based institutional investors. This paper summarises this code, the reasons behind its development and offers suggestions as to whether or not it is likely to achieve its objectives. (original abstract)
Opis fizyczny
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