Dyscyplina rynkowa a stabilność finansowa

• Autorzy: Krzysztof Jackowicz
• Języki publikacji: PL

Abstrakty

W opracowaniu podjęto próbę odpowiedzi na pytania: kiedy dyscyplina rynkowa sprzyja utrzymaniu stabilności finansowej, czy kapitałodawcy banków są zainteresowani obserwowaniem ich kondycji, czy kapitałodawcy potrafią oceniać ryzyko banków, czy skutki działań kapitałodawców sprzyjają utrzymaniu stabilności finansowej, kiedy pośrednia dyscyplina rynkowa jest poważnym narzędziem wspierającym utrzymanie dyscypliny rynkowej?

Słowa kluczowe

PL

Dyscyplina rynkowa; Stabilność finansowa; Interwencjonizm państwa; System finansowy; Ryzyko bankowe

EN

Market discipline; Financial sustainability; Government intervention; Financial system; Banking risk

• Czasopismo: Bank i Kredyt
• Rocznik: 2012
• Numer: nr 5
• Strony: 19

Twórcy

autor

Krzysztof Jackowicz

• Akademia Leona Koźmińskiego w Warszawie

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