PL EN


Preferencje help
Widoczny [Schowaj] Abstrakt
Liczba wyników
2011 | nr 2/1 | 353--364
Tytuł artykułu

How Can Shareholders and Creditors Lower the Agency Costs?

Treść / Zawartość
Warianty tytułu
Języki publikacji
EN
Abstrakty
EN
The main aim of the paper is to characterize agency costs and to point out how the actions undertaken by shareholders and creditors may limit them. Agency costs may be limited by the use of external and internal monitoring and by aligning the interests of shareholders and managers. The roles of effective and diversified boards, managerial remuneration and the quality of corporate governance reports in decreasing agency costs are pointed out. The level of debt and the use of protective covenants are also discussed as they may play an important role in solving agency problems. Other means of lowering agency costs include the securitization of debt, changing the level of dividend payments and share repurchases, the implementation of a principle against wrongful trading and the introduction of professional responsibility requirements for managers. The appropriate use of these mechanisms should reduce the agency costs and ultimately increase the value of the firm. (original abstract)
Rocznik
Numer
Strony
353--364
Opis fizyczny
Twórcy
  • Uniwersytet Gdański
Bibliografia
  • Campbell K., Underdown C. B. (1991) Corporate Insolvency In Practice, The Chapman Publishing Ltd., London.
  • Clarke T. (2007) International Corporate Governance. A Comparative Approach, Routlage, London & New York.
  • Commission Recommendation 2005/162/EC of 15 February 2005 on the role of non-executive or supervisory directors of listed companies and on the committees of the (supervisory) board. (OJ L 52, 25.2.2005)
  • Keasy K., Thompson S., Wright M. (2004) Corporate Governance. Accountability, Enterprise and international Comparisons, John Wiley &Sons, Ltd., Chichester.
  • OECD (2010) Corporate Governance and the Financial Crisis - Conclusions and emerging good practices to enhance implementation of the Principles, www.oecd.org/dataoecd/53/62/44679170.pdf.
  • Corporate governance framework for European companies: what needs to be improved? Strasbourg, 5 April 2011 IP/11/404
  • Damodaran A.(1997) Corporate Finance, Jon Wiley&Sons,Inc., New York.
  • European Commission (2010) Green Paper on Corporate governance in financial institutions and remuneration policies, http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/modern/corporate_governance_in_financial_institutions_en.htm.
  • European Commission (2011) Green Paper: The EU corporate governance framework; governance, http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2011/corporate-governance-framework_en.htm.
  • Greek S.(1993) Managerial Motivation and Strategy In Management Buy-Outs; A Cultural Analysis, "Journal of Business" No 66.
  • Hart O. (1995) Corporate Governance: Some Theory and Implications, "The Economic Journal" No. 105.
  • Insolvency Law and Practice, (1982) Report of the Insolvency Law Review Committee, Cmnd.8558, S.214 (4)
  • Jensen M.C.(1986) The Takeover Controversy: Analysis and Evidence, "Middland Corporate Finance Journal" No 4.
  • Jensen M.C. (1986) The Agency Cost of Free Cash Flow: Corporate Finance and Takeovers, "American Economic Review" No. 76.
  • Jensen M.C, W.H. Meckling (1976) Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, "Journal of Financial Economics" No.3.
  • Kim K., Nofsinger J.(2004) Corporate Governance, Pearson Prentice Hall.
  • Masulis R.(1988) Debt /equity Choice, Ballinger Publishing Company, Cambridge.
  • Moyer R.Ch., McGuigan J.R.,.Kretlow W.J (1992) Contemporary Financial management, West Publishing Company, New York.
  • Murphy K.J. (1985) Corporate Performance and managerial Remunerationn: An Empirical Analysis," Journal of Accounting and Economics" No. 4 (April).
  • Peterson P. (1994) Financial Management and Analysis, McGraw-Hill, New York.
  • Prowse S.D.(1990) Institutional Investment Patterns and Corporate Financial Behavior in United States and Japan, "Journal of Financial Economics" No 27.
  • Ross S. (1973) The economic theory of agency: The principal's problem, "American Economic Review" No.63.
  • Ross S.A., R.W. Westerfield, J.Jaffe (2005) Corporate Finance, McGraw-Hill International, New York.
  • Samuels J.M., Wilkes M.F., Brayshaw R.E.(1995) Management of Company Finance, Chapman and Hall, London.
  • Solomon J. (2007) Corporate Governance and Accountability, John Wi-ley&Sons Ltd., Chichester.
  • Ustawa z dnia 28 lutego 2003 r. ,,Prawo upadłościowe i naprawcze". Dz.U. Nr 60, poz.535 with amendments.
  • Williamson O.E (1988) Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance, "The Journal of Finance" No. 3.
Typ dokumentu
Bibliografia
Identyfikatory
Identyfikator YADDA
bwmeta1.element.ekon-element-000171214089

Zgłoszenie zostało wysłane

Zgłoszenie zostało wysłane

Musisz być zalogowany aby pisać komentarze.
JavaScript jest wyłączony w Twojej przeglądarce internetowej. Włącz go, a następnie odśwież stronę, aby móc w pełni z niej korzystać.