Corporate Governance : Paradigms, Dilemmas and Beyond

• Autorzy: Steve Letza , Xiuping Sun
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

The current debate on corporate governance has been 'polarised' between, on the one hand, the shareholding paradigm and, on the other hand, the stakeholding paradigm. However, underpinning the main theories are hidden paradox assumptions which leads to concerns over the credibility and validity of this dichotomised approach. Both camps of the debate rely on a homeostatic and entitative conception of the corporation and its governance structures, they suffer from inadequate attention to the underlying philosophical presuppositions in which the static approach is rooted. To avoid the traditional trap in theorising, an alternative processual approach is proposed for a better understanding of the inherent overflow and heterogeneity of corporate governance practices. (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

EN

Corporate governance; Shareholding; Stakeholders; Process-oriented approach

PL

Ład korporacyjny; Akcjonariat; Interesariusze; Procesowe podejście do zarządzania

• Czasopismo: The Poznań University of Economics Review
• Rocznik: 2002
• Tom: 2
• Numer: nr 1
• Strony: 43--65

Twórcy

autor

Steve Letza

• Leeds Metropolitan University

autor

Xiuping Sun

• Leeds Metropolitan University

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