Coordination of monetary and fiscal policy

• Autorzy: Paweł Marszałek
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

To achieve price stability, coordination of monetary and fiscal polices is required. The importance of coordination results from such premises as understanding the interdependence between monetary and fiscal policy, the role of central bank independence, the instruments-targets relation and financial stability as well. The lack of coordination will result in inferior overall economic performance, whereas providing it will give a better outcome for both policymakers. Therefore, coordination may be treated as the necessary condition for achieving price stability. (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

EN

Coordination of economic activity; Economic policy; Central bank independence; Price stability; Monetary policy

PL

Koordynacja działalności gospodarczej; Polityka gospodarcza; Niezależność banku centralnego; Stabilność cen; Polityka pieniężna

• Czasopismo: The Poznań University of Economics Review
• Rocznik: 2003
• Tom: 3
• Numer: nr 2
• Strony: 41--52

Twórcy

autor

Paweł Marszałek

• Poznań University of Economics, Poland

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