Two types of the Banzhaf-Coleman index in games with a priori unions

• Autorzy: Maria Ekes
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

The paper presented concerns a voting body divided into subsets (parties). We consider the Banzhaf-Coleman index of an individual counted as a product of its index inside the party in the majority voting game and the index of the party in the weighted voting game and the modified Banzhaf-Coleman index of the game with precoalitions. Both indices are not normalised and have probabilistic interpretation. We also examine changes of values of both indices caused by changes in the structure of precoalitions. (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

EN

Game theory; Paradox

PL

Teoria gier; Paradoks

• Czasopismo: Roczniki Kolegium Analiz Ekonomicznych / Szkoła Główna Handlowa
• Rocznik: 2006
• Numer: nr 15 Metody formalne w teorii gier, teorii wzrostu i ekonomii finansowej
• Strony: 31--45

Twórcy

autor

Maria Ekes

• Szkoła Główna Handlowa w Warszawie

Bibliografia

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• Valenciano Laurelle F., On the meaning of Owen-Banzhaf Coalitional value in voting situations, Theory and Decision 56, pp. 113-123, 2004.
• Leech D., Leech R., Voting Power and Voting Blocs, Warwick Economic Research Papers, No. 719, 2004.
• Owen G., Values of Games with a propri Unions, in Lecture Notes in Economics Mathematical Systems, Essays in Honour of Oskar Morgenstern, eds. R. Henn and O. Moschlin, Springer-Verlag, New York, pp. 76-88, 1977.
• Owen R., Modification of the Banzhaf-Coleman Index for Games with a priori Unions, in Power, Voting and Voting Power, ed. M.J.Holler, Physica-Verlag, Wurzburg, pp. 232-238, 1981.