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Liczba wyników
2011 | 3 | nr 1 | 1--24
Tytuł artykułu

Fiscal Policies and Monetary Leadership in a Monetary Union with a Deficit-Concerned Central Bank

Treść / Zawartość
Warianty tytułu
Języki publikacji
EN
Abstrakty
EN
We consider fiscal and monetary policy interactions in a monetary union under monetary leadership, when the common central bank is concerned with the average fiscal stance of the union. We use a static two-country monetary union model to investigate the policy-mix problem under different regimes of noncooperation, cooperation, and enforced cooperation among fiscal authorities. We find that fiscal policy is unambiguously countercyclical, a feature that is more pronounced under fiscal policy cooperation. Monetary policy can be either countercyclical or procyclical. A central bank concerned about the aggregate fiscal stance is effective in stabilizing output and central budget, but at the expense of inflation stabilization. (original abstract)
Rocznik
Tom
3
Numer
Strony
1--24
Opis fizyczny
Twórcy
  • University of Athens, Greece
  • University of Athens, Greece
Bibliografia
  • [1] Andersen T. M., 2008. The Macroeconomic Policy Mix in a Monetary Union with Flexible Inflation Targeting. Journal of International Money and Finance, 27, pp. 411-37.
  • [2] Baldwin R., Wyplosz C., 2004. The Economics of European Integration. McGraw Hill Education.
  • [3] Barro R., Gordon D., 1983. A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model. Journal of Political Economy, 91, pp. 589-610.
  • [4] Beetsma R., Debrun X., 2004. The Interaction between Monetary and Fiscal Policies in a Monetary Union: a Review of Recent Literature [in:] Beetsma R., Favero C., Missale A., Muscatelli A., Natale P., Tirelli P. (eds.) Monetary Policy, Fiscal Policies and Labor Markets: Macroeconomic Policymaking in the EMU, Cambridge University Press.
  • [5] Beetsma R., Bovenberg A. L., 2005. Structural Distortions and Decentralized Fiscal Policies in EMU. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 37, pp. 1001-18.
  • [6] Blinder A. S., Mankiw N. G., 1984. Aggregation and Stabilization Policy in a Multi-Contract Economy. Journal of Monetary Economics, 13, pp. 67-86.
  • [7] Buti M., Roeger W., In't Veld J., 2001. Stabilizing Output and Inflation: Policy Conflicts and Co-operation under a Stability Pact. Journal of Common Market Studies, 39, pp. 801-28.
  • [8] Buti M., Van Den Noord P., 2004. Fiscal Policy in EMU: Rules, Discretion and Political Incentives. European Commission, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, Economic Paper, No 206.
  • [9] Clarida R., Gali J., Gertler M., 1999. The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective. Journal of Economic Literature, 37, pp. 1661-707.
  • [10] Dixit A., 2001. Games of Monetary and Fiscal Interactions in the EMU. European Economic Review, 45, pp. 589-613.
  • [11] Dixit A., Lambertini L., 2001. Monetary-fiscal Policy Interactions and Commitment versus Discretion in a Monetary Union. European Economic Review, 45, pp. 977-87.
  • [12] Dixit A., Lambertini L., 2003. Interactions of Commitment and Discretion in Monetary and Fiscal Policies. American Economic Review, 93, pp. 1522-42.
  • [13] Gali J., 2008. Monetary Policy, Inflation, and the Business Cycle: An Introduction to the New Keynesian Framework. Princeton University Press.
  • [14] Gatti D., Van Wijnbergen C., 2002. Coordinating Fiscal Authorities in the Euro Zone: A Key Role for the ECB. Oxford Economic Papers, 54, pp. 56-71.
  • [15] Hughes Hallett A., 2005. In Praise of Fiscal Restraint and Debt Rules: What the Euro Zone Might Do Now. CEPR DP5043.
  • [16] Kirsanova T., Stehn S. J., Vines D., 2005. The Interactions between Fiscal Policy and Monetary Policy. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 21, pp. 532-64.
  • [17] Lambertini L., Rovelli R., 2004. Independent or Coordinated? Monetary and Fiscal Policy in EMU [in:] Beetsma R., Favero C., Missale A., Muscatelli A., Natale P., Tirelli P. (eds.): Monetary Policy, Fiscal Policies and Labor Markets: Macroeconomic Policymaking in the EMU, Cambridge University Press.
  • [18] Mundell R. A., 1961. A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas. American Economic Review, 51, pp. 657-65.
  • [19] Rogoff K., 1985. The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 100, pp. 1169-90.
  • [20] Svensson L. E. O., 1997. Optimal Inflation Targets, "Conservative" Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts. American Economic Review, 87, pp. 98-114.
  • [21] Uhlig H., 2003. One money, but many fiscal policies in Europe: What are the consequences? [in:] Buti M. (ed.) Monetary and Fiscal Policies in EMU: Interactions and Coordination, Cambridge University Press.
  • [22] Walsh Carl E., 2003. Monetary Theory and Policy. 2nd edition, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Typ dokumentu
Bibliografia
Identyfikatory
Identyfikator YADDA
bwmeta1.element.ekon-element-000171230691

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