R&D Rivalry and Cooperation in Duopoly: Firm Organization, Welfare and Policy Implications

• Autorzy: Joseph Hanna
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

The objective of the paper is to reveal the optimal organization of industry when firms, facing externalities, compete or cooperate in R&D as well as in the final output market. The model hinges on a two-stage game setting. A ranking of solutions is established for alternative organizations. We focus on welfare issues and allow for public intervention. Subsidizing R&D is used to draw the industry to match the social welfare solution. The paper shows that targeting the optimal level of R&D leaves final output fall short of the welfare solution. Whereas targeting the final output leads to overinvestment in R&D. The ranking of policies reveals that the most efficient industry organization occurs when firms cooperate and fully share R&D results, but remain competitive in the final good market.(original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

PL

Analiza wielokryterialna; Dotacje; Ekonomia dobrobytu

EN

Multicriteria analysis; Subsidies; Welfare economics

• Czasopismo: Multiple Criteria Decision Making / University of Economics in Katowice
• Rocznik: 2011
• Tom: 6
• Strony: 104--132

Twórcy

autor

Joseph Hanna

• Université de Valenciennes et du Hainaut-Cambrésis, France

Bibliografia

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