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2011 | 6 | 104--132
Tytuł artykułu

R&D Rivalry and Cooperation in Duopoly: Firm Organization, Welfare and Policy Implications

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The objective of the paper is to reveal the optimal organization of industry when firms, facing externalities, compete or cooperate in R&D as well as in the final output market. The model hinges on a two-stage game setting. A ranking of solutions is established for alternative organizations. We focus on welfare issues and allow for public intervention. Subsidizing R&D is used to draw the industry to match the social welfare solution. The paper shows that targeting the optimal level of R&D leaves final output fall short of the welfare solution. Whereas targeting the final output leads to overinvestment in R&D. The ranking of policies reveals that the most efficient industry organization occurs when firms cooperate and fully share R&D results, but remain competitive in the final good market.(original abstract)
Opis fizyczny
  • Université de Valenciennes et du Hainaut-Cambrésis, France
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