Concession-Making in Multi-Bilateral Negotiations and Multi-Attribute Auctions

• Autorzy: Gregory E. Kersten , Gimon Gimon

Warianty tytułu

Decyzje o ustępstwach w wielo-dwustronnych negocjacjach oraz wielokryterialnych aukcjach

• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

Reverse auctions and negotiations are two common procurement mechanisms. The drawback of many auctions is their sole focus on price. The drawback of negotiations is that they are sequential, slow and costly. The Internet enables multi-attribute auctions and multi- -bilateral multi-attribute negotiations efficiently. In both processes concession-making plays a key role. The paper presents typology of concessions, which has been empirically verified. The results show that: (1) bidders and negotiators use all types of permissible concessions; (2) bidders make more concessions in auctions than in negotiations; and (3) the use of singleand multiple-attribute concessions differs between auctions and negotiations. The results also show that buyers obtain the highest profit through auctions, then competitive negotiations and the lowest through cooperative negotiations. The reverse is true for the sellers.(original abstract)

Aukcje odwrotne (holenderskie) oraz negocjacje wielo-dwustronne, w których jeden nabywca negocjuje z wieloma sprzedawcami, to dwa często spotykane mechanizmy w transakcjach pomiędzy organizacjami. W artykule porównujemy odwrotne aukcje wielo- atrybutowe z wielo-dwustronnymi negocjacjami. Ustępstwa w obu procesach dotyczą zarówno cen, jak i innych atrybutów sprzedawanego produktu. Od tych ustępstw zależy uzyskanie kontraktu na sprzedaż. W artykule proponujemy oraz weryfikujemy eksperymentalnie taksonomię ustępstw, która jest oparta na dwóch kryteriach. Wyniki sugerują, że: (1) zarówno negocjatorzy, jak i uczestnicy aukcji używają wszystkich możliwych rodzajów ustępstw, (2) uczestnicy aukcji robią większe ustępstwa niż negocjatorzy, oraz (3) motywacja eksperymentatorów wpływa na zakres ustępstw uczestników. Wyniki sugerują także, iż nabywcy osiągają najwyższy zysk w aukcjach, następnie w negocjacjach kompetytywnych, a najniższy zysk w negocjacjach kooperatywnych. Dla sprzedawców najlepsze są kooperatywne negocjacje, a najgorsze aukcje.(abstrakt oryginalny)

Słowa kluczowe

EN

Negotiations; Auctions

PL

Negocjacje; Aukcje

• Czasopismo: Informatyka Ekonomiczna / Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny we Wrocławiu
• Rocznik: 2012
• Numer: nr 3 (25)
• Strony: 61--83

Twórcy

autor

Gregory E. Kersten

• InterNeg Research Center J. Molson School of Business, Concordia University Montreal, Canada

autor

Gimon Gimon

• InterNeg Research Center J. Molson School of Business, Concordia University Montreal, Canada

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