Rola "subiektywnych" prawdopodobieństw w decyzjach z ryzykiem

• Autorzy: Katarzyna Domurat

Warianty tytułu

"Subjective" Propability in Risky Decisions

• Języki publikacji: PL

Abstrakty

Niniejszy artykuł stanowi krótki przegląd sposobów interpretowania i traktowania prawdopodobieństwa w decyzjach z ryzykiem. W szczególności zajęto się w nim pojęciem subiektywnego prawdopodobieństwa oraz wag decyzyjnych wprowadzonych przez teorię perspektywy. Zarówno kiedy zajmowano się subiektywnymi odchyleniami ocen od obiektywnych prawdopodobieństw, jak również subiektywną transformacją prawdopodobieństw w postaci wag decyzyjnych, zaobserwowano specjalne traktowanie przez ludzi niskich prawdopodobieństw. Zarówno w percepcji jak i w transformacjach prawdopodobieństwa na wagi decyzyjne ludzie mają skłonność przeszacowywać zdarzenia, które pojawiają się rzadko. W ostatnim jednak okresie pojawiły się doniesienia, że w decyzjach opartych na bezpośredniej obserwacji częstości zdarzeń zmniejsza się przeważanie niskich prawdopodobieństw. (abstrakt oryginalny)

EN

The article is a short review of interpretation of probability and its significance for risky decisions. It especially deals with a concept of subjective probability and decision weights introduced by the prospect theory. While dealing with both subjective deviation from objective probabilities as well as subjective probability transformation as probability weighting function it was observed that people treat low probabilities differently. In both situations people tend to overestimate rare events. Recently it has been said, that in the decision based on direct observations of frequency of events, overestimation is much weaker. (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

PL

Podejmowanie decyzji w warunkach ryzyka; Informacja w podejmowaniu decyzji; Rachunek prawdopodobieństwa

EN

Decision making under conditions of risk; Information in decision making; Calculus of probability

• Czasopismo: Decyzje
• Rocznik: 2008
• Numer: nr 10
• Strony: 5--26

Twórcy

autor

Katarzyna Domurat

• Akademia Leona Koźmińskiego w Warszawie; Uniwersytet Warszawski

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