Czasopismo
Tytuł artykułu
Autorzy
Warianty tytułu
Języki publikacji
Abstrakty
We consider Cournot oligopoly with differentiated product. We develop respective sufficient conditions on the inverse demand and cost function that make the oligopoly a game of strategic substitutes when goods are substitutes and a game of strategic complementarities when goods are complements. The scope of this result is illustrated by examples. (original abstract)
Słowa kluczowe
Rocznik
Tom
Numer
Strony
199--211
Opis fizyczny
Twórcy
autor
- Szkoła Główna Handlowa w Warszawie
Bibliografia
- Amir R. (1996), Cournot oligopoly and the theory of supermodular games; Games and Economic Behavior, 15, 132-148.
- Amir R. (2005), Supermodularity and complementarity in economics: an elementary survey, Southern Economic Journal, 71(3), 636-660.
- Amir R., V. Lambson (2000), On the effects of entry in Cournot markets, Review of Economic Studies, 67, 235-254.
- Dubey P., Haimanko O., A. Zapechelnyuk (2006), Strategic complements and substitutes, and potential games, Games and Economic Behavior, 54(1), 77-94.
- Hoernig S.H. (2003), Existence of equilibrium and comparative statics in differentiated goods Cournot oligopolies; International Journal of Industrial Organization, 21, 989-1019.
- Novshek W. (1985), On the existence of Cournot equilibria, Review of Economic Studies, 52, 85-98.
- Milgrom P., J. Roberts (1990), Rationalizability, learning, and equilibrium in games with strategic complementarities, Econometrica, 58, 1255-78.
- Milgrom P., C. Shannon (1994), Monotone comparative statics, Econometrica, 62, 157-180.
- Topkis D. (1978), Minimizing a submodular function on a lattice, Operations Research, 26, 305-321.
- Vives X. (1990), Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities; Journal of Mathematical Economics, 19, 305-321.
- Vives X. (1999), Oligopoly pricing: old ideas and new tools, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Typ dokumentu
Bibliografia
Identyfikatory
Identyfikator YADDA
bwmeta1.element.ekon-element-000171237389