The EU's antidumping actions against Chinese products

• Autorzy: Yinan Liu
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

As the importance of tariffs in international trade has declined with the reduction of tariff rates under the GATT/WTO programs of multilateral trade liberalization, most governments prefer to protect domestic industries from foreign competitors through a variety of non-tariff barriers. Antidumping actions have recently become the world's biggest trade impediment due to their specific features and the antidumping activity of new users. Since China has become the major engine of world trade growth in recent years, it also has become the largest anti-dumping target in the world. However, the present world competition situation implies that world trade liberalization might arouse regional trade friction. The objective of this research is to identify whether China's WTO accession changed China's situation with regard to EU antidumping actions. The research analysis empirically proved that trade liberalization could partly affect the EU's antidumping actions against Chinese exports and the higher degree of industrial concentricity becomes a motive to increase the EU's antidumping activities against China. (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

EN

International trade; Antidumping duty; Empirical researches

PL

Handel międzynarodowy; Cła antydumpingowe; Badania empiryczne

• Czasopismo: International Journal of Management and Economics
• Rocznik: 2013
• Numer: nr 37
• Strony: 152--168

Twórcy

autor

Yinan Liu

Bibliografia

• Aggarwal A. (2004), Macro Economic Determinants of Antidumping: A Comparative Analysis of Developed and Developing Countries, World Development Vol. 32 No. 6, pp 1043-1057.
• Bagwell K. and Staiger R. (1990), A Theory of Managed Trade, American Economic Review No. 80(4), pp 779-795.
• Bagwell K. and Staiger R. (2005), Enforcement, Private Political Pressure and the GATT/WTO Escape Clause, Journal of Legal Studies No. 34(2), pp 471-513.
• Blonigen B.A., Bown C.P. (2002), Antidumping and retaliation threats, Elsevier Science B.V..
• Bown C.P. and Crowley M.A. (2007), China's Export Growth and the China Safeguard: Threats to the World Trading System, Department of Economic Research, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
• Knetter M.M. and Prusa T.J. (2005), Macroeconomic Factors and Antidumping Filings: Evidence from Four Countries, Journal of International Economics, No. 61, pp 1-17.
• Moore M.O., Zanardi M. (2007), Does Antidumping Use Contribute to Trade Liberalization in Developing Countries? George Washington University & Tilburg University & Center.
• Prusa T.J. (1996), The Trade Effects of U.S. Antidumping Actions, NBER Working Paper No. 5440, pp 1-20.
• Rosendorff B.P. and Milner H. (2001), The Optimal Design of International Trade Institutions: Uncertainty and Escape, University of Southern California Law School Economics and Organization Paper Series NC01-9.
• Oz Shy (2001), A Welfare Evaluation of Antidumping Rules, Department of Economics, Tel-Aviv University Smith A. (1974), The Wealth of Nations, The Pennsylvania State University.
• Xu S. and Tang Y., (2009), European Union Antidumping Investigations Against China - Characteristics and Determinants, The Chinese Economy, Vol. 42, No. 6, pp 66-80.
• WTO (2009) World Trade Report 2009: Trade Policy Commitments and Contingency Measures. Geneva, WTO. Printed in Switzerland, 2009, ISBN 978-92-870-3513-4.