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Economic Welfare According to the Chicago School of Competition
Języki publikacji
Abstrakty
Celem opracowania jest przedstawienie znaczenia dobrobytu społecznego w chicagowskiej teorii konkurencji, w tym w szczególności jako celu polityki konkurencji i kryterium oceny zachowań podmiotów rynkowych oraz porównanie sposobu rozumienia tej kategorii ekonomicznej z głównym nurtem ekonomii, a zwłaszcza ze szkołą neoklasyczną. (fragment tekstu)
The subject of this paper is to present the significance of economic welfare as an aim of the competition policy in general and according to the Chicago School as well as the way of understanding of this economic category by lawyers and economists who are intellectually involved with the University of Chicago compared with the mainstream economics, especially the neoclassical school of thought. In traditional terms economic welfare consists of consumer and producer surpluses and the goal of antitrust law is the maximization of either the total welfare or consumer welfare. For the Chicago School representatives the most important target of the competition policy is, admittedly, consumer surplus but they consider it equatable with the total welfare or the overall economic efficiency. The school equates consumer and producer welfare. This leads to different decisions in antitrust cases compared with the situation when an evaluation criterion of market conduct is its influence on the benefits obtained solely by consumers. (original abstract)
Rocznik
Strony
147--156
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autor
Bibliografia
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Typ dokumentu
Bibliografia
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bwmeta1.element.ekon-element-000171246159