New Approach to Remuneration Policy for Investment Firms : a Polish Capital Market Perspective

• Autorzy: Szymon Okoń
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

The experience of the recent financial crisis leads to reflections on the relevant mechanisms of risk reduction of an investment firms activity. Within the European Union, the Directive 2010/76/EU (CRD III) has introduced new rules regarding the remuneration policy for investment firms. The main goal was to reduce the risk of investment firms' activity. This is a prudential regulation. The purpose of this article is to evaluate, from the point of view of an investment firm, proposed by the EU legislator approach to remuneration policy aimed at reducing the risk of the operation of this type of financial institutions. The aim was to identify the key problems with which Polish investment firms may face in the future in connection with new remuneration policy rules. As far as the methodology is concerned, the author carried out in-depth and standardized interviews with the representatives of several investment firms in Poland. In addition, the method of observation has been applied. The results of the research demonstrates that the abovementioned regulations will have limited impact on reducing the risk of the activities of these financial institutions as well as their implementation will be difficult for them in practice. (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

EN

Financial market supervision; Enterprises; Remuneration

PL

Nadzór nad rynkiem finansowym; Przedsiębiorstwo; Wynagrodzenia

• Czasopismo: Contemporary Economics
• Rocznik: 2012
• Tom: 6
• Numer: nr 1
• Strony: 70--77

Twórcy

autor

Szymon Okoń

• Poznań University of Economics, Poland

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Identyfikatory

DOI

10.5709/ce.1897-9254.35