Ocena skuteczności handlu emisjami w Unii Europejskiej

• Autorzy: Krzysztof Pytka , Tomasz Kuszewski

Warianty tytułu

Effectiveness Evaluation of the European Union's Emission Trading System

• Języki publikacji: PL

Abstrakty

Celem pracy jest zbadanie wpływu wprowadzenia Europejskiego Systemu Handlu Emisjami (ETS) na emisję gazów cieplarnianych per capita oraz stwierdzenie, czy obecny kształt handlu emisjami przynosi statystycznie istotny spadek emisjochłonności gospodarek krajów Unii Europejskiej. Odpowiedź na tak postawione pytanie pozwoli nam ustalić, czy mechanizm internalizacji efektów zewnętrznych stosowany przez UE prowadzi do realizacji pożądanego celu w postaci zmniejszenia poziomu emisji gazów. W obecnym kształcie system opiera się o handel emisjami. Pierwotna alokacja praw w dominującej części przebiega według bezpłatnego rozdawnictwa uczestnikom rynku (nazywanego również "dziedziczeniem"). W I fazie działania mechanizmu przypadającej na lata 2005-2007 95% praw było alokowane przy użyciu tej metody, a w II fazie (lata 2008-2012) udział ten spadł do poziomu 90%. (fragment tekstu)

EN

The paper assesses the effectiveness of the European Union's Emission Trading System, which was launched in 2005 to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions across the bloc. Initially, the system covered around 11,000 energy-intensive industrial installations. The authors examine the EU's "cap-and-trade scheme" in terms of the Pigovian taxation and Coase bargaining models, two classic instruments for the internalization of externalities. The approach differs depending on which method is used for the initial allocation of emission allowances. Currently, the predominant method in the EU is the so-called costless grandfathering, which is equivalent to the model proposed by Coase, according to the authors. In the course of the analysis, Pytka and Kuszewski assess the effectiveness of the cap-and-trade scheme by employing two alternative approaches, an econometric analysis based on a test of linear restrictions and a model using a "differences-in-differences" estimator. For the linear-restriction models, data for EU countries from 2003 and 2005 were used, whereas the differences-in-differences analysis was carried out using data for EU countries and a control group of non-EU countries for the 2003-2007 period. The analysis shows that the system is ineffective in its current form, the authors conclude. (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

PL

Emisja zanieczyszczeń; Rynek emisji zanieczyszczeń; Emisja gazów; Polityka ekologiczna UE

EN

Pollution emission; Pollution emission market; Gas emissions; EU environmental policy

• Czasopismo: Gospodarka Narodowa
• Rocznik: 2010
• Numer: nr 5-6
• Strony: 73--89

Twórcy

autor

Krzysztof Pytka

• Szkoła Główna Handlowa w Warszawie

autor

Tomasz Kuszewski

• Szkoła Główna Handlowa w Warszawie

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