Criminal organisations and corruption in Italy

• Autorzy: Paolo Canonico , Stefano Consiglio , Ernesto De Nito , Gianluigi Mangia
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

Corruption in Italy presents a key issues for understanding many of the relationships in the world of business. Using similar words to those put forward by Zuckerman in his review of Callahan's book (2004) we could say that Italians have implicitly condoned a cheating culture, and that we are "not only cheating more, [but] feeling less guilty about it" (2006). In this article we claim that 1) within the business system is much more complex to understand where the is the line between the legal and illegal dimension. As Riccio3 stated the Italian mafia is not anymore to consider as the Anti-State but as something perfectly coherent with the spirit of our society. On the contrary of the State, Mafia can provide money, rules and profits in a real effectiveness way. 2) the dimension of corruption in Italy is not simply to interpret and to analyze: the micro and macro view (Ashforth et al., 2008) are not the right key to explain the whole phenomena; the only way it is to look at the entire dimension including social, economic and cultural value. In this sense the role of the criminal organisations is a part of a network in which many actors play an important role in order to get their own goals. In our opinion, looking at corruption in Italy it is not so relevant to analyze the single corruptive episode or the single organisation. It is much more useful to go in depth at the whole system. This perspective implies a logical consequence: to prevent corruption rules are needed, but they are not enough. Political choices may conflict with the fight against corruption. When we use the expression political choice, we refer to all the institutional organisations that play an important role in the economic and social system: government, political parties, local authorities, unions, etc. The question is: who really want to change? (fragment of text)

Słowa kluczowe

EN

Crime; Corruption; Informal organizations

PL

Przestępczość; Korupcja; Organizacje nieformalne

• Czasopismo: Organizacja i Kierowanie
• Rocznik: 2010
• Numer: nr 1
• Strony: 167--184

Twórcy

autor

Paolo Canonico

• University of Naples Federico II, Italy

autor

Stefano Consiglio

• University of Naples Federico II, Italy

autor

Ernesto De Nito

• University of Magna Graecia Catanzaro, Italy

autor

Gianluigi Mangia

• University of Naples Federico II, Italy

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