Institutional Causes of the Global Banking Crisis and the Emergence of Macro-Prudential Countercyclical Policy

• Autorzy: Andrzej Sławiński

Warianty tytułu

Instytucjonalne przyczyny globalnego kryzysu bankowego i pojawienie się polityki makroostrożnościowej

• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

The recent global banking crisis was caused by an intertwined process consisting of the emergence of universal financial conglomerates, the development of global interbank money markets, and of regulatory capture leading to an excessively libertarian approach to financial regulation and supervision. All these factors produced the three main sources of risks that brought about the global banking crisis, namely, enhanced credit pro-cyclicality, banks' interconnected-ness, and their growing exposure to balance sheet losses. The experiences with unsustainable lending booms of the previous decade showed that stabilizing inflation is not sufficient to stabilize the economy. These experiences underscore that macro-prudential policy should be a second weapon in central banks' countercyclical policy arsenal. (original abstract)

Niedawny światowy kryzys bankowy był efektem splotu powiązanych ze sobą przyczyn w postaci rozwinięcia się globalnych rynków pieniężnych, które stały się głównym źródłem finansowania niestabilnych boomów kredytowych, oraz powstania wielkich uniwersalnych konglomeratów finansowych, które uzyskały decydujący wpływ na kształt regulacji finansowych, doprowadzając do nadmiernej liberalizacji systemu regulacji i nadzoru bankowego. Wszystkie te czynniki stworzyły trzy główne źródła zagrożeń - w postaci zwiększonej procykliczności akcji kredytowej, rosnącej współzależności banków i rosnącego ryzyka ponoszenia przez banki strat bilansowych -które spowodowały globalny kryzys bankowy. Doświadczenia, związane z pojawieniem się w ostatniej dekadzie niestabilnych boomów kredytowych, pokazały, że stabilizowanie inflacji nie wystarczy dla stabilizowania gospodarki. Doświadczenia te wykazały, że polityka makroostrożnościowa powinna stać się drugim instrumentem polityki stabilizacyjnej banku centralnego. (abstrakt oryginalny)

Słowa kluczowe

EN

Banking crisis; Stabilisation policy; Financial sustainability; Central banks; Macroprudential policy

PL

Kryzys bankowy; Polityka stabilizacyjna; Stabilność finansowa; Banki centralne; Polityka makroostrożnościowa

• Czasopismo: Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Oeconomica
• Rocznik: 2013
• Tom: 295 Financial Markets and Macroprudential Policy
• Strony: 7--24

Twórcy

autor

Andrzej Sławiński

• Warsaw School of Economics, Poland

Bibliografia

• Adrian T., Shin H. S. (2008), "Liquidity, Monetary Policy, and Financial Cycles", Current Issues in Economics and Finance, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, pp. 1-7.
• Alessandri P., Haldane A. (2009), "Banking on the state", Bank of England, November.
• Baker A. (2010), "Restraining Regulatory Capture? Anglo-America, crisis politics and trajectories of change in global financial governance", International Affairs, 86, no. 3, p. 647-663.
• Beau D., Clerk L., Mojon B. (2011), "Macro-prudential policy and the conduct of monetary policy", Occasional Paper no. 8, Bank of France.
• Blanchard O. (2011), Monetary Policy in the Wake of the Crisis. Presentation for the IMF conference "Macro and Growth Policies in the Wake of the Crisis", Washington, 7-8 March 2011.
• Blundell-Wignall A. B. (2011), "On the Necessity of Separation Investment and Commercial Banking ", Intereconomics, no. 6.
• Bordo M., Olivier J. (2002), "Monetary Policy and Asset Prices: Does 'Benign Neglect' Makes Sense?", International Finance, 5(2), p. 139-64.
• Borio C. (2012), "The financial cycle and macroeconomics. What have we learnt", BIS Working Papers, no. 395.
• Borio C., Lowe P. (2002), "Asset Prices, financial and monetary stability: exploring the nexus", BIS Working Papers, July 2002.
• Borio C., Disyatat P. (2011), Global imbalances and the financial crisis: Link or no link?, BIS Working Papers, No. 346, May.
• Brandon R. G., Padovani M. (2011), "The determinants of bank's lobbying activities", Research Paper Series, No. 11-56, Swiss Finance Institute.
• Brunnermeier M., Crockett A., Goodhart Ch., Persaud A. D., Shin H. (2009) The Fundamental Principles of Financial Regulation, Geneva Reports on the World Economy, ICMB, London, No. 11.
• Brzoza-Brzezina M., Kolasa M., Makarski K. (2013), "Macroprudential policy and imbalances in the euro area", National Bank of Poland Working Paper, no. 138.
• Calomiris Ch. W., Kahn Ch. M. (1991), "The Role of Demandable Debt in Structuring Optimal Bank Arrangements", The American Economic Review, vol. 81, No. 3, June, pp. 497-513.
• Calvo G., Reinhart, C. M. (2002), Fear of floating, "Quarterly Journal of Economics", no. 107.
• Carpenter D. H., Murphy M. M. (2010), The Volcker Rule: Proposal to Limit Speculative Propriety Trading by Banks", CRS Report for Congress, June 30.
• Cecchetti, S. G., Genberg H. Lipsky J., Wadhwani S. (2000), Asset Prices and Central Bank Policy CEPR, Geneva Reports on the World Economy, no. 2.
• Clarke B. J., Hardinan N. (2012), "Crisis in the Irish Banking System", UCD Working Papers, no. 2.
• Danielson J., Embtrechts P., Goodhart Ch., Keating C, Muennich F., Renault O., Shin H. S. (2010), "An Academic Response to Basel II", LSE Special Paper, No. 130.
• Drehmann M., Borio C, Gambacorta L., Jimenez G., Trucharte C. (2010), "Countercyclical capital buffers: exploring options", BIS Working Papers No. 317, July.
• European Commission (2012), High Level Expert Group on reforming the structure of the EU banking. Final Report, October 2, Brussels.
• Financial Services Authority (2009), The Turner Review. A regulatory response to the global banking crisis, March, p. 46.
• Galati G., Moessner R. (2011), "Macroprudential policy - a literature review", BIS Working Paper, no. 337.
• Goodhart Ch. (2010), "How should we regulate financial sector?" [in] The Future of Finance. London School of Economics and Political Science, p. 165-185.
• Goodhart Ch. (2011), The Macroprudential Authority: Powers, Scope and Accountability, "Special Paper", no. 203, LSE Financial Markets Group Paper Series, October.
• Goodhart Ch., Persuad A. (2008), "A party pooper's guide to financial stability", Financial Times, 5 June, p. 9.
• Gorton G. B., Metrick A. (2009), "Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo", NBER Working Paper no. 15223
• Green R. K., Wachter S. M. (2007), "The Housing Finance Revolution", Prepared for the 31th Economic Policy Symposium: Housing, Housing Finance and Monetary Policy, Jackson Hole, Wyoming.
• Griffith-Jones S., Persaud A. (2003), "The Political Economy of Basel II and Implications for Emerging Economies", Seminar on Management of Volatility, Financial Liberalization and Growth in Emerging Economies, ECLAC, Santiago De Chile, April 24-25.
• Hahm J-H., Mishkin F. S., Shin H. S., Shin K. (2012), Macroprudential Policies in Open Emerging Economies, NBER Working Paper 17780, January 2012.
• Haubrich J. G. (2007), "Some Lessons on the Rescue of Long-Term Capital Management", Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Discussion Paper, no. 19.
• Hume M., Sentance A. (2009), "The global credit boom: challenges for macroeconomics and policy", Discussion Paper No. 27, Bank of England.
• Igan D., Mishra P., Tressel T. (2009), "A Fistful of Dollars: Lobbying and the Financial Crisis", IMF Working Paper no. 287.
• Independent Commission on Banking (2011), Final Report. Recommendations, September, London.
• International Monetary Fund (2011), Macroprudential Policy Tools and Frameworks. Progress Report to G20, 27 October, www.imf.org/external/np/g20/pdf/102711.pdf.
• Jabko N., Massoc E. (2012) "French capitalism under stress: How did Nikolas Sarkozy rescued the banks", Review of International Political Economy, vol. 19, no. 4, October, pp. 562-585.
• Jenkins R. (2011), Lessons in lobbying, Speech at the third Gordon Midgley Memorial Debate. Bank of England, 11 November.
• Johnson S., Kwak J. (2010), 13 Bankers. Wall Street Takeover and the Next Financial Meltdown. Pantheon.
• King M. (2012), "Twenty years of inflation targeting", Speech, London School of Economics. 9 October.
• Kowalczyk M., Kruszka M. (2011), "Macro-Prudential Regulation of Credit Booms and Busts. The Case of Poland". Policy Research Working Paper no. 5832, The World Bank, October 2011.
• Lall R. (2009), "Why Basel II Failed and Why Any Basel III is Doomed, GEG Working Paper no. 52.
• Lall R. (2010), "Reforming Global Banking Rules: Back to the Future?", DIIS Working Paper no. 16, Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen.
• Lapavitsas C, Dos Santos P. L. (2008), "Contemporary Banking: On the Impact of New Technology", Contributions to Political Economy, pp. 31-56.
• Learner E. (2007), "Housing Is the Business Cycle", NBER Working Paper 13428, September.
• Levitin A. J., Wachter S. (2012), "Explaining the Housing Bubble", Georgetown Law Journal, vol. 100, no. 4, pp. 1177-1258.
• Lim C. H., Krznar I., Lipinsky F., Otani A., Wu X. (2013), "The Macroprudential Framework: Policy Responsiveness and Institutional Arrangements", IMF Working Paper, no. 166. July.
• Lo A. W. (2009), "Regulatory reform in the wake of the financial crisis of 2007-2008", Journal of Financial Economic Policy, vol. 1, p. 4-43.
• Lo A. W. (2001), "Risk Management for Hedge Funds: Introduction and Overview," Financial Analysts' Journal, November/December 2001, 16-33.
• Lubiński M. (2013), "Międzybankowy rynek pieniężny i zarażenia", Gospodarka Narodowa, no. 5-6.
• McGuire P., von Peter G. (2009), "The US dollar shortage in global banking", BIS Quarterly-Review, March.
• Małecki W. (2013), "Przemiany sektora bankowego i ich konsekwencje". Ekonomista, forthcoming.
• Makkai T., Braithwaite J. (1992), "In and out of the revolving door: making sense of regulatory capture", Journal of Public Policy 12:1, pp. 61-78.
• Minsky H. P. (1986), Stabilizing an Unstable Economy, New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
• Osiński J. (2010), "Wnioski z obecnego kryzysu dla kształtu krajowej sieci bezpieczeństwa finansowego - model "trójzębu" nadzorczego', Bezpieczny Bank, Nr 1(40), s. 71-97.
• Ostry J. D., Ghosh A. R., Habermeier K., Laeven L., Chamon M., Qureshi M. S., Kokenyne A. (2011), "Managing Capital Inflows: What Tools to Use?", IMF Staff Discussion Note, IMF, Washington.
• Persaud A. (2008), "Sending the Herd over the Cliff. Again", Finance and Development, June, p. 32-33.
• Persaud A. (2009), "Macroprudential Regulation", Crisis Response, Note no. 6, World Bank.
• Posen A. S. (2006), "Why Central Banks Should Not Burst Bubbles?", International Finance, 9:1, pp. 109-124.
• Rajan R. G. (2010), Fault lines, Princeton University Press, Oxfordshire.
• Reinhart V. (2011), "A Year of Living Dangerously: The Management of the Financial Crisis in 2008", Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 25(1): 71-90.
• Ren H. (2011), Countercyclical Financial Regulation", Policy Research Working Paper no. 5823, World Bank, October.
• Rey H. (2013), "Dilemma not Trilemma: The global financial cycle and monetary policy independence", paper presented at the Jackson Hole Symposium, August 2013. Forthcoming as a CEPR Discussion Paper.
• Roubini N. (2006), Why Central Banks Should Burst Bubbles?, Stern School of Business, New York University, January 2006.
• Shin S. H. (2011), Adapting Macroprudential Policies to Global Liquidity Conditions, Paper prepared for the Central Bank of Chile 2011 Conference, 17-18 November.
• Shin H. S. (201 la), "Macroprudential Policies Beyond Basel III", Policy memo, Princeton University, 22, November.
• Singh M. (2011), "Velocity of Pledged Collateral: Analysis and Implications", IMF Working Paper no. 256.
• Singh M., Aitken J. (2010), "The (seizable) Role of Rehypthetication in Shadow Banking System", IMF Working Paper, no. 172.
• Singh M., Stella P. (2012), "Money and Collateral", IMF Working Paper no. 95.
• Szpunar P. (2012), "Rola polityki makroostrożnościowej w zapobieganiu kryzysom finansowym", Materiały i Studia, Zeszyt nr 278.
• Taylor J. B. (2009), "The Financial Crisis and the Policy Responses: An Empirical Analysis of What Went Wrong", NBER Working Paper, no. 14631.
• Thirkell-White B. (2009) "Dealing with banks: populism and the public interest in the global financial crisis", International Affairs, no. 4, pp. 689-711.
• Turner A. (2010), "What do banks do, what should they do and what public policies are needed to ensure best results for the real economy?" CASS Business School, 17th March.
• Warwick Commission (2009), The Warwick Commission on International Financial Reform: In Praise of Unleveled Playing Fields. University of Warwick, Coventry, UK.
• Wilmarfh A. E. (2002), "The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry, 1975-2000: Competition, Consolidation and Increased Risks", University of Illinois Law Review, No. 2, May, p. 223.
• Wilmarth A. E. (2009), "The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial Conglomerates and the Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis", Connecticut Law Review, Vol. 41, No. 4.