Instytucje ekonomiczne i polityczne a ceny dóbr konsumpcyjnych

• Autorzy: Aldona Zawojska

Warianty tytułu

Economic and Political Institutions and Consumer Prices

• Języki publikacji: PL

Abstrakty

W artykule dokonano analizy roli instytucji w zróżnicowaniu cen dóbr i usług konsumpcyjnych, w tym żywności, pomiędzy wybranymi krajami Unii Europejskiej. Badanie ma celu sprawdzenie, czy w państwach UE występuje statystyczny związek pomiędzy relatywnym poziomem cen a wybranymi wymiarami instytucji. Zmiennymi reprezentującymi instytucje i ich egzekwowanie są wskaźniki Wordwide Governance Indicators Banku Światowego, Economic Freedom of the World Instytutu Frasera oraz wybrane dane z Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey EBOR i Banku Światowego. Szeregi czasowe dotyczące relatywnych cen pozyskano z OECD oraz Eurostatu. Przyjęty okres badawczy zawiera się w latach 1996-2010. Do określenia statystycznego związku cen z instytucjami wykorzystano współczynniki korelacji liniowej Pearsona. Wyniki badania liniowego związku pomiędzy różnymi wymiarami instytucji i relatywnymi cenami nie wskazały jednoznacznych podobieństw między krajami lub podobieństw czasowych co do siły i kierunku powiązań, ale korelacje niektórych cech z cenami były umiarkowane lub wysokie. (abstrakt oryginalny)

EN

This paper analyzes the role of institutions in price setting and cross-country price disparity. The objective of the study was to test whether there is a statistical relationship between relative price levels and selected dimensions of quality of institutions. The whole observation period runs from 1996 to 2010. Data set includes comparative consumer and food price levels from the Eurostat-OECD PPP Programme as well as an institutional quality indices produced by the World Bank (Wordwide Governance Indicators), the Fraser Institute (the survey Economic Freedom of the World) and the EBRD-World Bank (Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey). The analysis separately covers Central and Eastern European EU Member States, and Poland with Denmark. The results of the linear relationship between the different dimensions of institutions and price levels did not indicate the similarities between countries and in time with regard to strength and direction of that relationships, although correlations between the prices and some institutional variables were moderate and high. (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

PL

Dobra konsumpcyjne; Ceny dóbr konsumpcyjnych; Instytucje ekonomiczne

EN

Consumer goods; Consumer prices; Economic institutions

• Czasopismo: Roczniki Ekonomii Rolnictwa i Rozwoju Obszarów Wiejskich
• Rocznik: 2012
• Tom: 99
• Numer: z. 4
• Strony: 7--28

Twórcy

autor

Aldona Zawojska

• Szkoła Główna Gospodarstwa Wiejskiego w Warszawie

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